

PB 34-93-1

JANUARY-MARCH 1993

Military Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

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Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin

"The IBOC will revolutionize the way our Corps supports combat commanders, now and into the 21st century. It is the right concept, at the right time, for our Corps and the Army."

-Major General Paul E. Menoher Jr.

Military Intelligence

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Volume 19 Number 1



- 2 Vantage Point
- 4 From the Editor
- 4 Letters
- 41 Subscription Form
- 47 Proponent Notes
- 49 Total Force
- 56 Professional Reading

FEATURES

- 6 **An Introduction to Our Intelligence Branch Operational Concept**
by Major Robert E. Hallagan
The New concept articulates a vision for deploying and employing Army forces in the future. The article describes the Intelligence System of Systems and the structure that will be needed to deliver strategic, operational, and tactical level intelligence to combat commanders and Army decision makers.
- 16 **Answering the "Why" of Training: The Hierarchy of Tasks**
by Major Brian J. O'Connor
This process helps every squad, platoon, and company officer and NCO identify tasks for training as well as the supporting relationship of that task to the battalion's METL.
- 18 **Effective GSR Training**
by Captain Michael Colarusso and Staff Sergeant Richard L. Sigler
Although the GSR platoon is emphasized here, these sound principles apply to any platoon. The key is a productive working relationship between the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant.
- 23 **Training for an NTC Rotation: A Direct Support MI Company Team Perspective**
by Captain Mark R. Wallace
This training technique serves as a model for other company teams preparing for an NTC rotation.
- 27 **Fighting and Winning at the NTC**
by Major Duane C. Young
There's no "silver bullet" solution to this problem, but Major Young asks the hard questions that, when answered, will give you an edge in achieving this goal.

29 LRS Unit METL Training: The JTF-6 Solution

by Captain Christopher Paul McPadden

An LRS unit gets valuable real-world training. Joint Task Force Six missions provide the opportunity for a unit to train its METL.

31 The S2 and Light Infantry Scouts

by Captain Joseph H. Grable

This article not only covers a gap in our doctrine with some good tactics, techniques, and procedures but also offers some training nuggets for everyone.

38 MI Battalion Synchronization Matrix: Tactical Tool for the Commander and Staff

by Captain Timothy J. Moynihan

Learn how to streamline the command estimate process and end up with a product that is easy to understand and execute.

42 Threats to the New World Order

by Alan R. Goldman, Ph.D., and Eric Vardac

The authors present the framework for an analysis of future conflicts likely to engage U.S. vital interests. They also forecast where conflicts are likely to occur and discuss the probable U.S. role.

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
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VANTAGE POINT

By Major General Paul E. Menoher Jr.

This issue of **MIPB** features an article on our new Intelligence Branch Operational Concept (IBOC). We are also featuring more training articles by field units to continue the dialogue in **MIPB** on good ideas from which the entire MI Corps can benefit. All professional intelligence personnel should read the IBOC article, and should read the full concept as soon as possible. The final draft of the IBOC was published June 29, 1992.

The IBOC outlines how we as a branch must operate to support field commanders properly, as we transition from a forward deployed to a predominately CONUS-based, force projection Army. The concept integrates the new family of systems we will field between now and 1997, and is the basis, along with the new (1993) **FM 100-5, Operations**, for a major revision of our intelligence doctrine. The revision starts with **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, the coordinating draft of which will soon be in the field for comment. The concept has already served as the basis for totally new organizational designs for MI units at every echelon and has been incorporated into all officer and NCO Academy courses at the Intelligence Center.

The concept article in this issue clearly articulates the major changes from our past doctrine, but doesn't fully explain why we made them. The following provides some of our rationale for the major changes.

Intelligence Functions. We have expanded our traditional functions by adding indications and warning (I&W), intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and battle damage assessment (BDA); and we modified two others: target development has been expanded to add targeting and incorporate the electronic countermeasures portion of electronic warfare; and the counterintelligence function has been changed to a more encompassing and proactive function of force protection.

Rationale. Many of you will say that I&W, IPB, and BDA are subsets of situation development, and you are not wrong in saying so. However, each function has taken on such importance in its own right in our new concept and in a force projection

Army, that we believe they must be addressed separately.

Adequate warning is an absolute imperative for successful force projection operations. IPB at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels is equally critical not only to planning and execution of the initial or early entry phase of force projection operations, but also to all subsequent phases as well. IPB is the best tool we have ever had to understand and organize the battlefield, focus the entire intelligence effort, and synchronize all battlefield operating systems. It is recognized throughout the Army as a mandatory function, and we can do no less. Similarly, BDA has taken on added importance since Desert Storm. Adding to that, a major feature of our new warfighting doctrine, as expressed in the revised **FM 100-5**, is simultaneous attack to the depths of the battlefield, which will require effective BDA to determine if the attacks have had the desired effects.

Modifying the target development function to add targeting is designed to capitalize on the capabilities inherent in our new family of systems—seven of them will provide targeting accuracies by themselves with one detection of a target, and five of them will broadcast the data in near real time (NRT) simultaneously to multiple echelons down to maneuver brigade. This new targeting capability will enable us to pass targets directly from sensors to shooters, but the "decide" phase of the targeting process must be executed properly in advance.

Including electronic countermeasures in the expanded targeting and target development function is designed to demonstrate that it is an attack option—like fires and attack air—that is focused by intelligence.

The traditional counterintelligence function is incorporated into the new force protection function. It not only includes multidiscipline counterintelligence and intelligence support to operations security, but also adds the task of assessing unit vulnerabilities and operational risks. It also includes the notion of proactive counter RISTA (reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition), or

(Continued on page 53)

By Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson

We continue to experience a problem meeting promotion requirements for sergeant in the following MOSs: 96B, 96D, 97B, and 97G. Although PERSCOM exhausts the standing list for these MOSs every month, we remain at 80 percent of authorization. Clearly, there are eligible soldiers who would be promoted if they went before the board. I am not suggesting that you promote just because you can, but I do need your help in getting soldiers who qualify before the board. This would help with the shortfall and would also increase unit readiness.

As of last October, attendance at BNCOC is required for promotion to staff sergeant. The BNCOC Automation Reservation System (BARS) guides this process and the BARS Report appraises you of the BNCOC reservation status. It is very important that you understand how the BARS Report works. The following information applies to combat support and combat service support MOSs only.

The BARS Report

The BARS Report is produced quarterly. The BARS process begins 6 months before the first class of that quarter. (In April, the process begins for classes to be held that October-December.) The Personnel Data Base Scheduling office provides the Army Training Requirements and Reporting System (ATRRS) programmer personnel and assignment data on soldiers from specialist to staff sergeant. The ATRRS programmer begins by weeding out records of soldiers not eligible to attend BNCOC. Records with combat arms MOSs, blank data (such as DEROS or NCOES Code), and AEA codes not compatible with school attendance (such as bar to re-up) are disqualified. All other soldiers are considered qualified to attend BNCOC and their records are processed in BARS to fill approximately 4,000 class seats. There are two categories of reservations: TDY and return and TDY en route.

TDY and Return

The Armywide Order of Merit List is used to make initial reservations for TDY and return. BARS lists all

soldiers by rank in the following priority: staff sergeant by DOR; sergeant (P) by promotion points; sergeant by DOR; and specialist (P) by promotion points. BARS schedules soldiers for school according to this priority. A copy of the reservations and candidates list is provided to the NCOES section at PERSCOM. That report is forwarded to career branches within PERSCOM for verification; returned to the NCOES Section with corrections for input into ATRRS; and, finally, rerun and distributed through MACOMs to the installations.

TDY En Route

The BARS Report or the career branch makes initial reservations for TDY en route. The Personnel Data Base information provides PCS assignment data on the individual. If an individual PCS date, based on report date/DEROS, matches a school start date, BARS will schedule the soldier TDY en route. **It is important to note that a separate message may not follow, so the BARS Report would be used to amend the PCS orders for TDY en route.**

The assignment manager or professional development NCO at the career branch can schedule a soldier TDY en route while working the BARS Report or while making an assignment. In the latter case, a message is sent or special instructions are included in the PCS assignment data.

Substitutions and Cancellations

The NCOES Section enters all BNCOC reservations. All substitutions and cancellations must come through the appropriate channels to the NCOES Section. ATRRS keeps files on all soldiers scheduled for BNCOC. The files contain information on soldiers who have been scheduled, how many times scheduled, if they arrived for training or were no-shows, and if they were released, failed, or graduated. A no-show in this file does not reflect favorably on the soldier's record. No-show reports and history files can be run through the installation ATRRS terminal.

Substitutions. BARS schedules the most qualified.
(Continued on page 55)

FROM THE EDITOR

Just as tactical commanders formulate their concept of the operation, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Major General Paul E. Menoher Jr., has formulated a new Intelligence Branch Operational Concept (IBOC). The IBOC, featured in this issue, is a milestone in U.S. Army Intelligence history. It reflects the way The Military Intelligence Branch will respond to changing world events.

This issue's column was written by Colonel Robert B. Mangold, former Director of Operations, Training, and Doctrine, United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, to further discuss the IBOC.

As we go to press, Army forces have deployed to Somalia to participate in one of the largest humanitarian relief efforts ever undertaken—Operation Restore Hope. We have never been involved in a military operation quite like this before. A review of the world situation clearly shows the potential for us to undertake similar operations in the future. For Army Intelligence, a new generation of challenges will be presented in terms of how we use our assets and the finished intelligence we provide.

Our intelligence doctrine is the best any army has ever known. It has proved itself on the battlefield and in countless exercises of every description, involving small and large forces across the operational continuum. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, our doctrine was proved in joint operations as well.

No matter how good our intelligence doctrine is, there is always room for improvement. Future operations offer us a superb opportunity not only to revalidate it, but also to enhance its ground truth using experiences gained from circumstances not imagined a few weeks ago.

So whether you are assigned to the Pentagon, a deploying soldier, or somewhere in between, an important responsibility now rests on your shoulders. Use our doctrine as it is written before resorting to shortcuts or hip pocket solutions. If our current approved doctrine does not meet your needs and/or you come up with a better way to do it, document it and share your ideas. Send comments to Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-TD, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; or phone, DSN 821-3055; or FAX, DSN 879-6198.

Robert B. Mangold



LETTERS

Dear Editor:

CW4 (Retired) Garry L. Smith's article, "The Army Foreign Language Problem: Strategies for Solution" (July-September 1992), highlights a significant problem in tactical MI units and proposes a solution to the "language mix" problem. I disagree with his proposal to remove language-

qualified interrogators and voice intercept specialists from tactical MI units.

I am confused as to how Mr. Smith can argue for a linguist brigade and then state that "pulling all interrogators and voice intercept specialists out of MI units is a mistake." He also proposes that "we could use specialists who have had difficulty reaching mandated proficien-

cy levels in tactical MI units." If these soldiers are having trouble now, how will they raise proficiency levels if all they do is maintain equipment and conduct police calls? These soldiers should be trained to standard, reclassified, or eliminated from service.

A tactical linguist must be able to perform linguist tasks to standard as well as to maintain proficiency in com-

mon and crew tasks. The proposed solution is a command and control nightmare. A commander must be able to train his crews to standard and base METL assessment on demonstrated performance. If commanders have to request TOE augmentation every time units deploy on an exercise, they may not be guaranteed the same crews each time. Crew stabilization, training, and execution are pillars of battle-focused training that will not be realized using the outlined solution.

Furthermore, this violates several leadership principles:

1. **Know your soldiers and look out for their well-being.** Commanders don't possibly know their soldiers if they don't belong to them all the time.

2. **Build the team.** This is impossible if we put individuals in Unit Manning Report slots instead of using already trained and emplaced crews with an identified chain of command.

3. **Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities.** If commanders don't know their soldiers and can't build the team, then they have little chance of evaluating the unit's ability to accomplish its METL and to employ teams effectively.

Our crews have become very proficient in performing battle and team tasks while integrating with maneuver elements at the combat training centers. A tactical unit's reliance on a linguist brigade or battalion for support will negate the training value earned at NTC, JRTC, and CMTC. The solution to the problem must be found in tactical MI units. The first step is to determine the correct "language mix" through the METL-development process described in **FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training**.

The linguist brigade and battalions are not solutions. They are more headaches for tactical MI commanders. All requirements must flow from the mission. **Define the mission** and you will begin to solve the "language mix" problem, while still maintaining tactical and technical proficiency in voice intercept crews and interrogation teams.

1LT David P. Warshaw
Wurzburg, Germany

Dear Editor:

The article by CW4 (Retired) Gary L. Smith on the Army's foreign language problem (July-September 1992) ad-

resses a problem that is, indeed, in need of a fix. Unfortunately, Mr. Smith's solutions don't go far enough.

First of all, I agree with him on the importance of keeping foreign language proficiency pay. However, the current system only pays Reservists about 17 percent of what equally competent Active duty counterparts get. At the same time, Reservists are expected to maintain their language skills on their own. Since Reserve linguists are expected to maintain the same proficiency level as those on Active duty, they should receive the same pay.

In regard to the creation of a CONUS-based linguist brigade, the Reserve Component has already been directed to implement a similar concept in the **Expansible RC MI** battalion. This program is designed to pull all the linguists from CEWI battalions so they can concentrate fully on language training.

The problem with both a linguist brigade and the **Expansible RC MI** battalion is they don't adequately address the MI commander's mission training concerns. Both these concepts are fine as long as the only thing needed is a trained pool of interpreters. But how can MI commanders be expected to train their units into a cohesive fighting force when they don't routinely have control over a major portion of their go-to-war assets?

In addition, a major flaw of both concepts is the lack of an adequate plan for tactical IEW equipment maintenance. Mr. Smith's suggestion is to leave a few of the least language proficient soldiers in tactical units to perform equipment maintenance. One can only imagine what their morale will be like when they spend all their time in the motor pool maintaining equipment for someone else.

Perhaps a better solution would be to do away with the CEWI concept altogether. At its best, CEWI is no more than a forced marriage of the different MI disciplines whose garrison relationships have little to do with how they interact in the field. Give the ground

surveillance radars back to the line units they support. CI should go to division since it is a division asset anyway. Long-range surveillance detachments should also be attached directly to the division. Separate interrogation companies could be created with one target language or with three platoons, each with a different language. The configuration would depend on FORSCOM's projected requirements for the number of linguists needed in each language.


This would leave only the signals intelligence MOSs which could be formed into independent intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) companies. These companies would each have only one target language assigned. Have these units rotate through the NTC and/or JRTC so they can maintain their wartime skills and so their combat commanders and staffs can practice using them. For the same reason, these units could also be sent to various posts to participate in division level field training exercises. Mr. Smith's idea of having them concentrated at Fort Ord has even more merit in this case, as not only would Defense Language Institute facilities be accessible, but also Fort Irwin (and the NTC) is within a reasonable distance. In a contingency situation, FORSCOM could select the units with the correct language mix and OPCON them to deploying combat units.

I concur with Mr. Smith that something needs to be done. But MI linguists can't be expected to function in a combat environment, with any proficiency, if they don't get regular training to prepare them for that role. Nor can maneuver commanders effectively use their IEW assets without regularly training with them. The end result of both the proposed linguist brigade and the **Expansible RC MI** battalion concepts would be to leave the tactical CEWI unit as a hollow shell unprepared to fulfill its wartime mission.

CW2 Frank M. Patton, USAR
Louisville, Kentucky

This issue of **MIPB** may be arriving to you later in the quarter than you are accustomed to. Production of this issue has been delayed due to problems securing a printer. Distribution of the remainder of the 1993 issues should follow the more normal release at the start of the quarter. We appreciate your support of your professional journal. Letters to the Editor help us to better identify what you are looking for in this publication. Address all comments and inquiries to: Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, ATZS-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 65613-6000.

An Introduction to our INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OPERATIONAL CONCEPT



by Major Robert E. Hallagan

We have entered a revolution in Army Intelligence. It is important for every professional MI soldier and civilian to read and understand our new Intelligence Branch Operational Concept (IBOC) for support to future military operations. The new concept describes a vision for deploying and employing Army intelligence forces in the future. Concepts provide a start point that underpins our Branch modernization plan as well as our doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for Army operations.

What is the New Concept

Approved by the TRADOC Commander, the Army IBOC describes strategic, operational, and tactical level intelligence support to the Army, through the transition years to 2002. It is written to help you understand how the Intelligence System of Systems will support combat commanders and Army decision makers: the basic purpose of the Army MI Corps. It also establishes the basis for the evolution in Army Intelligence doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and materiel development.

The Need for a Concept

At this time, Army Intelligence doctrine is undergoing an evolution in order to—

- ☐ Capitalize on the introduction of our new Army and other services' intelligence systems and technology. (Figure 1 shows the MI systems fielding time lines.)
- ☐ Respond to revolutionary changes in regional security threats.

- ☐ Support the Army's new primary mission of strategic combat power projection (rather than forward-based deterrence).
- ☐ Adapt to the downsized Army force structure.
- ☐ Carry out directed changes in the functions and organization of DOD intelligence activities.
- ☐ Capitalize on lessons learned in war and at the Combat Training Centers.

The Future Army

We will not know in advance where our military operations will occur, nor who our enemy or allies will be. However, we do know that the Army will—

- ☐ Be largely CONUS-based with a relatively small forward presence in Europe, Northeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.
- ☐ Be smaller, existing mainly as a strategic contingency force.
- ☐ Be able to reinforce its forward presence to deter aggression or to execute contingency operations elsewhere.
- ☐ Be a rapidly deployable and extremely lethal force.
- ☐ Be tailorable to meet an enemy on a battlefield anywhere in the world and achieve decisive victory.
- ☐ Conduct other military operations short of war, including peacetime engagement, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, counter-drug operations, and peacetime contingency operations.

For a glossary of acronyms and terms used in this article, refer to page 52.




Figure 1 - MI systems fielding time lines.

Mission

In this future force, the Army Intelligence mission will be the same as it is today: to provide timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support to tactical, operational, and strategic commanders across the continuum of military operations and the threat spectrum. This will reduce uncertainty and risk to U.S. forces and permit the effective application of force and forces.

Evolution

Army Intelligence forces and doctrine at strategic, operational, and tactical levels must evolve to support the new force requirements. Projecting combat power from CONUS will require us to focus on peacetime threat analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), mobilization, deployment, employment, and total joint planning and execution. Army Intelligence must be prepared to deal with a wide range of regional threats, from the most primitive to state-of-the-art technology.

Army echelons above corps (EAC) intelligence will continue to have a forward presence, have access to sources covering denied areas, and be responsible for not only providing processed intelligence to operational and tactical echelons, but also for remoting raw intelligence data to those echelons for exploitation. Army EAC intelligence units will play a vital role, especially in peacetime preparation for contingencies and during transition through crisis response back to peace or into military operations. It will be critical in all phases for

EAC intelligence organizations to focus downward to support commanders at echelons corps and below (ECB) as well as those commanders traditionally supported at EAC.

ECB intelligence collection will play a critical role during military operations. It will provide the detail and responsiveness needed to execute and win battles and engagements while continuing to draw from reinforcing EAC sources.

Functions of Army Intelligence

At all echelons, the traditional functions of intelligence units and staffs have been modified. An increased level of effort will be required when projecting combat power against ambiguous threats into undeveloped theaters with little warning. The mission, threat, time, and available resources will require commanders to set priorities and define the level of effort to be applied to each function at each echelon. Leader and management responsibilities are shown below.

- **FOCUS DOWNWARD**
- **PRIORITIZE AND SYNCHRONIZE**
- **DISCIPLINE PRODUCTION**
 - COMPLEMENTARY
 - REINFORCING
- **CONTROL DISSEMINATION PROCESS**
 - BROADCAST
 - PULL WHAT IS NEEDED
 - PUSH CRITICAL INFORMATION
- **DELIVER ON PIR EVERY TIME, ON TIME**
 - "STATUS AT A GLANCE" PRODUCTS
 - DETAILED INFORMATION BY PRODUCT OR FILE

Army Intelligence functions will include the following responsibilities:

1. **Indications and warning (I&W).** I&W provides early warning to prevent surprise and to detect enemy actions that prove or run counter to planning assumptions. All of this reduces risk. I&W information is developed not only by intelligence units, but also by the entire reconnaissance and surveillance force: cavalry, scouts, aviation, air defense (AD), and frontline forces. I&W information must be adequate so that the commander can react to changes in the threat posture and accelerate deployment and/or execution of a particular contingency plan, or change the plan to adjust to the threat.

2. **Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).** Commanders and staffs need effective decision making tools. IPB's products and process allow commanders to understand the battlefield or area of operations and synchronize all their battlefield operating systems for maximum effect. IPB products are an integral part of a streamlined, continuous command planning process. The results give commanders information they need to allocate fires, forces, terrain, and multipliers (for example, combat service support (CSS), engineers, AD, and field artillery). IPB is essential to focus the commander's priority intelligence requirements

(PIR), targeting priorities, and, consequently, the intelligence collection effort.

IPB takes on added emphasis for the force projection Army and must be done well before deployment and with great precision to ensure safest possible entry of deploying forces into the theater of operations.

3. **Force protection.** Force protection, or security of the force, is a command responsibility the intelligence system supports. Force protection operations not only identify and counter enemy intelligence collection capabilities, but they also assess friendly vulnerabilities and risks to the force. At division and brigade, force protection, especially, must take on a proactive focus of targeting enemy reconnaissance forces to deny them the ability to collect intelligence on friendly forces.

4. **Situation development.** This is a dynamic and continuing process used to help confirm or deny enemy courses of action. All-source information is integrated into concise, objective, graphic portrayals of the current situation. It contains predictive judgments on the situation and what the implications will be for operational planning and execution.

At brigade, the primary tool to receive, correlate, and display this information will be the Common Ground Station (CGS) (see Figure 2). The CGS is




Figure 2 - Common ground station.

an outgrowth of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) Ground Station Module (GSM). It will automatically correlate and display—

- ☐ The Joint STARS screen display.
- ☐ The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) video display.
- ☐ Signals intelligence (SIGINT) from the GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS), the U2-R, the RC-135 Rivet Joint and the Tactical Intelligence Broadcast System (TIBS), and tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP) TRAP broadcast.

Other reports and information can be entered by the analyst or received through the Army Common User System (ACUS) communications. Division and higher echelons will also employ the CGS for near real time (NRT) receipt and display of situational data and will complement the CGS with the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) which will support G2s and commanders with all-source intelligence fusion, situation and target development, and collection management capabilities.

5. Target development and targeting. This function provides targets and targeting information for attack by fire, maneuver, and electromagnetic means. Commanders use the information in deciding what, when, where, and by what means to engage targets. Again, the primary tool at brigade will be the CGS. At division and above, the CGS will primarily support targeting after the "decide" or tar-

get development function has been performed. ASAS will provide primary support to target development at these echelons.

6. Battle damage assessment (BDA). This function delivers a timely and accurate analysis of the results of a military operation in terms of damage and impact on enemy combat effectiveness. BDA is both a collection and an analysis and production process. BDA gives the commander the ability to assess whether or not his strikes have had the desired effect on the enemy's combat effectiveness and capabilities so he knows whether he can proceed with his original concept, must restrike the enemy to ensure desired effect, or must adjust his concept because he can't produce that effect within the time lines required.

Commanders must articulate their BDA requirements along with their PIR and targeting priorities dynamically. At division and brigade, UAVs will be the primary BDA collection source along with pilot and frontline unit reports. UAVs will downlink to Joint STARS GSMs at division and brigade, and UAV Ground Control Stations (GCSs) will also be located at both echelons. Division will launch and recover the UAVs. Some portion of the UAVs will be given to brigades for their control and use, then handed back to division for recovery.

The Intelligence System of Systems

Army Intelligence will perform its functions and support the Army through an Intelligence System of




Figure 3 - System of Systems.

Systems (see Figure 3). Underwriting this entire concept is the fact that no echelon has all of the organic assets required to fully satisfy its commanders' intelligence requirements. As a consequence, we must have flexible, reliable communications and automation to interface with other echelons to obtain requisite support. These are the characteristics of the Intelligence System of Systems:

- ☐ It is a flexible and tailorable architecture of procedures, organizations, and equipment focused on a common need—the combat commander's information needs.
- ☐ The system of systems complements and reinforces each echelon's organic capabilities and, when necessary, provides direct support (DS) to commanders whose organic intelligence capabilities cannot be brought to bear. Inherently, any commander can benefit and be supported by these capabilities, based on need and priority.
- ☐ It can provide comprehensive support from national to tactical levels.
- ☐ It supports commander's information needs anywhere in the continuum of military operations.
- ☐ The Intelligence System of Systems is always engaged.

Echelonment

The Intelligence System of Systems must simultaneously support the needs of multiple commanders and multiple echelons. Each echelon has unique organic intelligence capabilities and varied sophisticated means to meet the commander's planning and execution needs at that echelon.

The divisional MI battalion will provide multidiscipline DS companies for up to three maneuver brigades and general support (GS) at division. (Figure 4 shows an MI battalion, armored division, and Figure 5 shows an MI battalion, light infantry division.) The focus will be on those products and intelligence functions tactical commanders need in order to plan, fight, and win battles and engagements. In GS of the division will be—

- ☐ An integrated collection management, technical control, and an all-source Analysis and Control Element (ACE) under the control of the G2 (see Figure 6).




Figure 4 - MI Battalion, Armored Division.




Figure 5 - MI Battalion, Light Infantry Division.

- ☐ Automated intelligence processing, fusion, correlation, display, and dissemination (CGS and ASAS-Block I).
- ☐ Intelligence special purpose communications (TROJAN SPIRIT II, GOLDWING, and SUCCESS).
- ☐ UAV—close range (CR) and short range (SR).
- ☐ Ground-based and heliborne SIGINT collection and communications jamming (Ground-Based Common Sensor [GBCS] and Advanced QUICKFIX [AQF]).
- ☐ Enemy prisoner of war interrogation (IPW) and document exploitation.




Figure 6 - Analysis and Control Element.

- ☐ Counterintelligence (CI).
- ☐ Long-range surveillance (LRS) (light divisions only).
- ☐ Battlefield weather forecasts and effects information (integrated meteorological system [IMETS] and automated meteorological sensor system [AMSS]).
- ☐ Secondary imagery dissemination (tactical high mobility terminal [THMT] [see Figure 7] or mobile integrated tactical terminal [MITT]).

The three DS companies from the divisional MI battalion (Figure 8) will each provide—

- ☐ Automated multidiscipline intelligence and combat information receive, correlation, and display (CGS).
- ☐ UAV control.
- ☐ IPW and document exploitation.
- ☐ CI.
- ☐ Remote sensing (light divisions only).
- ☐ Command and control to accept reinforcing capabilities, such as ground-based SIGINT collection and communications jamming, based on METT-T.

The corps echelon will provide multidiscipline IEW support: both reinforcing support to divisions, separate brigades (see Figure 9), and GS to the corps (see Figure 10). The corps will be the primary echelon that processes and analyzes current intelligence from strategic- and theater-level sources. The focus of corps intelligence operations will be on the corps' and the major subordinate commander's needs to plan and execute major operations across the extended battlefield. The corps will have a robust organic intelligence capability, and will provide—




Figure 7 - Armored Division.




Figure 8 - Armored Brigade.




Figure 9 - MI Brigade Corps.

- ☐ An integrated collection management, technical control, and all-source analysis element (an analysis and control company within the headquarters and operations battalion).
- ☐ Automated intelligence processing, fusion, correlation, display, and dissemination (ASAS-Block I and the CGS).
- ☐ Intelligence special purpose communications (TROJAN SPIRIT II, GOLDWING, and SUCCESS).
- ☐ Sophisticated IMINT and SIGINT processors (imagery processing and dissemination sys-

tem [IPDS]/tactical radar correlator (TRAC), electronic processing and dissemination system (EPDS), TCAC, and enhanced tactical users terminal [ETUT]).

- ☐ Special electronic mission aircraft and UAVs (GRCS and UAV-SR).
- ☐ LRS.
- ☐ IPW and document exploitation.
- ☐ CI.
- ☐ Weather observations, forecasting, and interpretation (IMETS and AMSS).
- ☐ Automated terrain analysis.

Army EAC focus will be to provide multidiscipline IEW support to Joint Task Forces, Army Service Component Commands, and ECB forces (see Figure 11). Army EAC will provide—

- ☐ Deployable, scaleable, high-frequency, intercept, direction finding, and jamming support (TRACKWOLF, AN/TLQ-17A SANDCRAB, the Army High-Frequency Electronic Warfare System [AHFEWS], and the Single-Source Processor - SIGINT).
- ☐ Reinforcement to select national sensor nodes to leverage strategic SIGINT and IMINT collection and sophisticated processing systems for the Army service component and supported corps.
- ☐ Overt human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, interrogation, document exploitation, and CI support.




Figure 10 - Corps.




Figure 11 - Army, Echelons Above Corps.

- ☐ Battlefield technical intelligence.
- ☐ Operational intelligence products such as graphic templates, annotated imagery, and tailored weather forecasts.
- ☐ Ground component intelligence support to the Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) and rein-

forcement in the form of a Joint MI Support Element (JMISE).

- ☐ Reinforcement to corps intelligence operations in the form of a Corps MI Support Element (CMISE).

- The JMISE and CMISE, along with the EAC MI brigade in each theater, to create "smart" bridges between echelons to ensure a truly seamless system of intelligence systems focused on supporting the warfighter.

Communications and Processing

A serious concern underlying the entire IBOC is the communications requirement. It cannot be overemphasized that Army Intelligence cannot function without a communications system that can—

- Receive and transmit digital imagery, templates, graphics, terrain products, and bulk data bases.
- Conduct multibased operations simultaneously.
- Access worldwide DOD, theater (see Figure 12), corps, and division data bases.
- Provide direct dissemination through broadcast, point to point, and common user channels.

For the immediate future, our primary long-haul intelligence communications system for contingency operations will be the TROJAN SPIRIT II architecture (see Figure 13), combined with the TENCAP communications architecture and the CGS/commander's tactical terminal (CTT) (see Figure 14). When the Army common user packet switch nodes (PSNs) are up and running in the

area of operations, we will interface with them and use them as well. It is a key objective of ours to push this communications architecture down below brigade to directly link with the battalion level command and control system.

Intelligence Leadership and Management Responsibilities

At each echelon, the G2/S2 is responsible for setting priorities and synchronizing intelligence collection, production, and dissemination. Detailed planning and preparation will be required to develop the refined operations plan, graphics, synchronization matrices, and the commander's decision support template to support a commander's concept of operations. The G2's objective must always be to provide commanders the intelligence, targets, and BDA they need, when they need them, in the format they can use, synchronized with their concept of operations.

The MI battalion commanders' responsibility, then, is to support the G2 by training their multidiscipline teams to be proficient in their mission essential tasks, and personally lead those teams to success in combat. MI battalion and DS company commanders must understand the division or brigade commanders' mission and intent; the capabilities of their units, including strengths and weaknesses; and enemy capabilities. Based on their analyses of those factors, battalion com-




Figure 12 - Potential required communications connectivity.




Figure 13 - Trojan Spirit, generic architecture.




Figure 14 - Commanders Tactical Terminal-Hybrid and Success Radio.

manders must establish a command and control system that promotes flexibility and freedom to operate under standardized staff practices.

Summary

A short article, such as this, can only outline the principles and tenets of the new concept. The most important point for you to retain is that the primary purpose of the Army MI Corps is to support commanders engaged in, or planning for, military operations. We do this through the Intelligence

System of Systems: both equipment and organizations. These principles apply to the entire Army MI Corps; we cannot lose sight of this focus.

We earnestly invite your constructive comments regarding this concept. Please send them to U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Director of Training and Doctrine, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-D (Captain Jerry L. Schlabach), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

Endnotes

The complete concept paper containing extensive discussion of communications and processing architectures, training and doctrinal impacts, and force modernization information has been provided to Army major commands. Also, we briefed the concept to nearly all Army G2s and MI unit commanders at the April 1992 G2 and MI Commander's Conference. For more information write, through your chain of command, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Directorate of Combat Developments, ATTN: ATZS-CD, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

Major Robert E. Hallagan is assigned to the Directorate of Combat Developments. He was commissioned from the ROTC program at Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology in 1977, and holds a master's degree in Joint C³ Systems Technology from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is a graduate of the CGSC and the Advanced Cryptologic Course, the National Cryptologic School. Major Hallagan has served at the tactical and joint levels as well as within TRADOC.

For a glossary of acronyms and terms used in this article, refer to page 52.

Answering the "Why" of Training: The Hierarchy of Tasks

By Major Brian J. O'Connor

When you visit unit training, do your soldiers ever ask you, "Why are we doing this?" Wouldn't it be nice if your most junior leader could readily answer that question without any prompting from you?

In the 101st MI Battalion, officers and NCOs, together, developed a process that achieves just that; it is called the hierarchy of tasks. This process defines the relationship between the Mission Essential Task List (METL), through the unit collective tasks, down to the supporting individual soldier tasks. Our process is simply a more thorough and documented application of procedures and principles in **FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training**.

The hierarchy of tasks process involves three steps:

- ☐ Defining the battalion METL.
- ☐ Identifying collective tasks.
- ☐ Defining individual tasks.

Defining the Battalion METL

All commanders are charged with the task of defining the battalion METL and getting their METLs approved by their superiors. Our senior leaders developed our METL within the framework of contingency plans and higher headquarters guidance. Our METL has five tasks:

- ☐ Deploy.
- ☐ Build combat power.
- ☐ Conduct intelligence and electronic warfare operations.

- ☐ Sustain.
- ☐ Command and control.


Identifying Collective Tasks

The process of identifying those collective tasks encompassed by each of the METL tasks required an exhaustive search of Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and ARTEP Mission Training Program (AMTP) tasks. We also used brainstorming and common sense to fill in the gaps because ARTEPs and AMTPs do not cover everything the battalion does. This process helped us identify all the key collective tasks needed to accomplish each METL task.

Once we formulated the list of supporting collective tasks, we went one step further and organized the supporting collective tasks graphically. We used a series of consolidated "Battle Tasks" to build the first layer of the hierarchy of tasks. The chart below shows what this looked like for one of the METL tasks.

The battalion command group or S3 section of officers organized most of these tasks. Later in the process, the collective tasks were defined by a combined group of battalion and company commanders, the command sergeant major and first sergeants, and the battalion's primary and special staff.

Up to this point, the focus had been to define the collective tasks the battalion required. As **FM 25-101** indicates, this is largely an officer function. However, the inclusion of senior NCOs was



now essential in preparation for the last step.

Defining Individual Tasks

The command sergeant major and first sergeants were given the framework of the METL to collective task hierarchy. Then they returned to their units to identify the individual tasks associated with the supporting collective tasks.

Unique to divisional MI battalions is the distinct varieties of intelligence disciplines and functions between companies. No two of our companies are alike in organization, manning, expertise, or abilities. Yet, each is an integral part of the support so essential to division and maneuver brigades.

Senior NCOs had to go back to their companies to poll subject matter experts in each of the varying disciplines and topics. Junior NCO leaders were also active in this process. This all came together because of the NCOs' interest in steering their training and their wealth of knowledge in correlating individual tasks.

Company commanders were intimately involved in this process also. First sergeants, platoon leaders and sergeants, junior NCO leaders, and subject matter experts all submitted to the company commander their lists of proposed supporting individual tasks for each of the METL supporting collective tasks. These lists were then compiled.

Once again, the battalion commander relied on the unit to define supporting individual tasks. Battalion and company commanders, the command sergeant major and first sergeants, and the


battalion's primary and special staff collated the work of the individual companies.

Progress was relatively easy for discipline-specific collective tasks where a single company had the expertise, such as "Conduct Long-Range Surveillance Operations." However, because company leaders and soldiers were more experienced and gave more input, progress was slower for common collective tasks, like "Prepare for POMCUS Deployment." (POMCUS is the prepositioning of materiel overseas.) Consensus and common sense were the guiding factors throughout this phase.

We took this process one step further, and listed the supporting individual tasks graphically. We added to the first layer of the hierarchy and built the second layer. The chart below shows what this looked like for one of the supporting collective tasks of one of the METL tasks.

Using the Hierarchy of Tasks

The hierarchy of tasks became the foundation for defining the battalion's training program. We established the environment for solid training management by publishing annual and quarterly guidelines and calendars with specified time lines. We also got the word out during weekly training management sessions at platoon, company, and battalion levels. Using the hierarchy of tasks, officers and NCOs in every squad, platoon, and company could easily identify tasks for training, as well as the supporting relationship of that task (individual or collective) to the battalion's METL.



This is only the beginning of the story. As battalion soldiers train for rotations at the National Training Center (NTC) or counter-drug training, we review and revise our hierarchy of tasks. It is a dynamic document. To ensure it serves future battalion leaders' needs, it is continually updated with input from various training and operational assessments.

By the way, it is, indeed, rewarding to observe

junior leaders correctly and authoritatively explain to their soldiers why certain training is being conducted.

Major O'Connor is the S3 at the 101st MI Battalion, 1st Infantry Division. He was commissioned an Armor Officer through ROTC at Loyola University in Chicago. Major O'Connor recently single-tracked as an MI officer.

Effective GSR Training

By Captain Michael Colarusso and
Staff Sergeant Richard L. Sigler

Training prepares soldiers, leaders, and units to fight and win in combat—the Army's basic mission.

FM 25-100, Training the Force

Too often, young, inexperienced leaders don't understand their role in training. Normally, the new GSR platoon leader does not bring much training experience to his platoon. Although the platoon sergeant can help develop effective training, he can't do it alone. Together, the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant must determine their platoon's collective training tasks. Sharing this responsibility is an integral part of developing battle focus. If the platoon leadership fails to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions, the platoon will fail in combat.

This article focuses on the creation of a platoon training program, and touches on the development of a platoon SOP. Some of the general principles we've outlined here apply to any platoon.

Use Doctrine as a Basis for Training

Before developing a training plan, the platoon leadership should read (or reread) **FM 25-100, Training the Force**; **FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training**; **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**; **FM 34-10, Division IEW Operations**; and **FM 34-80, Brigade and Battalion IEW Operations**. There are no finer blueprints for training success. These manuals outline training principles and explain do's and don'ts of task development, planning, execution, and evaluation.

The platoon leadership should also consult

ARTEP 34-288-10-MTP, Mission Training Plan for GSR Platoon, Intelligence and Surveillance (I&S) Company, MI Battalion. This document contains many tasks a GSR platoon must perform and it provides a solid base on which to build a platoon training program. Finally, each GSR platoon must consider the METL, command guidance, training resources, and the training priorities of its parent company and battalion, since these differ from unit to unit.

Once the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant know the basic training principles and their unit's wartime mission, they can take the next step in developing a platoon training program.

Determine Platoon Collective Tasks

When developing or reviewing the company METL, the I&S company commander must create a team approach to battle focused training by involving subordinate leaders. The commander asks the GSR platoon to identify platoon collective tasks that support certain company METL tasks, such as "Conduct IEW Operations." The commander then reviews the platoon's collective task list and determines which tasks are most important. The approved collective task list is the basis for the platoon's training plans. The collective tasks of the GSR platoon in B Company are—

- ☐ Perform a Tactical Road March.
- ☐ Occupy an Assembly Area.
- ☐ Prepare for GSR Operations.
- ☐ Move Tactically.
- ☐ Occupy and Prepare a Radar Site.
- ☐ Search and Locate Targets.
- ☐ Identify and Report Target Information.
- ☐ Execute Operations in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environment.

The platoon leader and the platoon sergeant give the approved collective tasks to the squad leaders and help them determine the squad collective tasks that support the platoon's tasks. The platoon sergeant helps each squad leader identify the soldier tasks necessary to support the squad's tasks. The platoon sergeant also selects the leadership tasks squad leaders must be able to perform. Besides the GSR MTP, leader and soldier tasks come from other sources, including 96R (GSR Operator) and 11B (Infantryman) Soldier Training Publications and Common Skill Manuals. Figure 1 shows a platoon task with its leader, collective, and soldier tasks.

The platoon leader must approve all the tasks selected to support the platoon's collective tasks. All soldier, leader, and squad collective tasks are subject to change if training experience shows they don't help accomplish the mission. In other words, training allows units to validate the adequacy of task lists and to make changes as required.

Develop a Hierarchy of Tasks

Each platoon collective task and the subordinate tasks essential to its accomplishment have a relationship that must be demonstrated to be fully understood. A hierarchy of tasks demonstrates these relationships. Task hierarchies start with the most complex task and break out supporting tasks in order of accomplishment. Figure 2 shows the hierarchy for a platoon collective task. Leaders can use hierarchies to teach squad leaders, team leaders, and soldiers how important soldier and collective task performance is to accomplishing platoon tasks.

Assess Training in the Platoon

Once the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant establish the platoon's task list, they know the tasks the platoon must be able to perform to accomplish its wartime mission. However, before scheduling new training, they must assess current



Figure 1. Platoon task with collective and individual tasks.

training levels. How well can the platoon perform critical tasks? Which tasks need more training?

There are many ways to determine the platoon's proficiency. Among these are performance at combat training centers, ARTEP evaluations, skill qualification test and common task test results, command inspection program results, physical fitness test scores, weapons qualification records, and personal observation.

For B Company, performance during Operation Desert Storm was the ultimate test of the platoon's proficiency. Still, leaders must assess the platoon's proficiency during and **between** deployments and major training events. A continuous assessment helps the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant plan training that improves weak areas and sustains strong ones. A lane training program is one of the best ways to assess training in the platoon.

Implement the Platoon Lane Training Concept

The Army uses lane training programs throughout its units because these programs allow the commander to tailor training. A lane training program places a GSR squad in a battlefield environment with a realistic mission. While one radar



Photo by SSG Sipher

A radar team operating a vehicle-mounted PPS-5 GSR during Operation Desert Storm.

squad is evaluated, another provides a dedicated opposing force (OPFOR) for the lane. The rest of the squad provides observer/controllers (O/Cs) and logistic support.




Figure 2. Hierarchy for a Platoon Collective Task.

While the lane training concept is used Army-wide, the program outlined here emphasizes **assessing training** as much as it does **providing training**. This is a fundamental difference from the approach used by some units, which often build training lanes to train in areas already assessed as being weak. The GSR lane gives the platoon and company headquarters a continuous and accurate assessment of platoon proficiency in all its tasks.

Another benefit of this program is it lets the platoon execute and assess training without intensive resource support from the company or battalion. The only outside resources are Class I, rations; Class III, petroleum, oils, and lubricants; Class V, ammunition and pyrotechnics; MILES equipment; and a training area. The platoon can even safely and efficiently recover nonmission-capable vehicles with tracked vehicle tow bars.

Build a Lane Training Program

Start the program with a purpose statement, such as "to train GSR teams to provide mission support to maneuver battalions and task forces." Add a conformity statement that says who the program applies to and how often to execute it. The terminal training objective describes the desired result of training. For a GSR platoon this would be the ability to provide ground surveillance support to the division. This is an I&S company METL task and an MI battalion battle task.

The lane has a dedicated OPFOR whose training objective is to replicate the enemy in a way that forces the evaluated squad to perform soldier, leader, and collective tasks.

Base Situational Exercises on Platoon Collective Tasks

The lane's sequence of events places six situational exercises (STXs) back to back. Each STX corresponds to a platoon task and the subtasks needed to accomplish it. Leaders conduct an AAR after each STX to evaluate smaller component tasks of the overall mission as they are performed. By evaluating performance immediately, soldiers retain lessons learned and can relate them to what they just did.

Integrate Battle Drills into the Training Lane

Battle drills are planned and rehearsed reactions to specific situations that help units survive on the battlefield. They are automatic responses to circumstances and don't require a leader's decision. Collective in nature, battle drills require small unit members to execute various actions **simul-**

taneously to make sure they survive and accomplish the mission. Examples of battle drills include—

- ☐ Road marches.
- ☐ Day and night occupations of radar sites or unit assembly areas.
- ☐ Actions on contact, such as direct or indirect fire, air attack, NBC attack, ambush, and obstacles.

Many individual and collective tasks evaluated on the lane are part of platoon battle drills. The drills are in the platoon's SOP, a necessary guide for the lane training program. More about this later.

Begin Squad Actions on the Lane

The GSR training lane, shown in Figure 3, can be run in most training areas. However, a key requirement is radar sites with a clear line of site to a target area at least 2 kilometers away.

When run independently, this lane takes the platoon 4 days. In B Company, the lane sometimes runs as part of a company field training exercise and takes 5 days. While under company control, the platoon rehearses company road march and assembly area procedures. The lane training program begins when the commander releases the platoon.

The evaluated squad executes a tactical road march to a simulated brigade tactical operations center (TOC), where the first STX, "Prepare for GSR Operations," begins. The brigade "task-organizes" the squad with one radar section (two teams) supporting a notional armor task force and another supporting a mechanized task force. Movement through the lane is staggered, with one section preceding the other. Both sections move to their simulated battalion TOCs (the same TOC replicating a different task force for each section) and coordinate with the battalion S2. Once team leaders finish preparing for a mission, culminating in the team's operations order, STX 1 is complete and each team's dedicated O/C conducts an AAR.

The teams then move out from the battalion TOC and begin STX 2, "Move Tactically." Teams move down a route provided by their task force to a release point. En route to the release point, the OPFOR attacks. This forces the evaluated teams to execute tactical movement and enemy contact battle drills. The teams then encounter an obstacle. After they deal with the obstacle, STX 2 is complete, and the O/Cs begin another AAR.

In this way, radar teams move through all six STXs on the lane. After completing the lane, the platoon reconsolidates and moves to the final AAR site.

Conduct AARs at the End of Each STX

As stated earlier, AARs occur at the end of each STX, which has an evaluation checklist with the tasks the squad must try to execute. The checklists also provide standards which break each task down into its component parts. This lets the O/C give the team leader an objective record of the team's performance. This record drives the AAR process.

NCOs from squads not being evaluated act as O/Cs. As O/Cs evaluate their peers, they learn lessons they can apply to their own team training and performance.

The final AAR is the most critical of all. It is conducted at the conclusion of the lane with the entire platoon present. This discussion of the lane impacts on every soldier. The platoon leader directs

the review process. The O/Cs, platoon leader, and platoon sergeant prepare for this AAR by consolidating their observations the night before and deciding what points to bring out. The AAR focuses on the platoon's task list-derived training objectives and emphasizes meeting the standards.

The framework for the AAR process has four parts:

- ☐ Establish what happened.
- ☐ Determine what was right or wrong with what happened.
- ☐ Determine how the task should be done differently the next time.
- ☐ Perform the task again.

Obviously, the last step is omitted at the final AAR. Therefore, schedule each STX with enough flexibility to allow corrective training at the end.




Figure 3. GSR Training Lane.

A good AAR site provides adequate light, warmth (or coolness), quiet, and comfort for soldiers worn out by 4 days of fast-paced training. Soup, coffee, or cool drinks add to a relaxed, comfortable environment. Since the AAR site is critical to its success, coordinate for a suitable building with range control well in advance.

Develop a Platoon SOP

To function effectively in combat, a platoon must have an SOP—the cornerstone of a combat-ready unit. The SOP serves three purposes:

- ☐ It is an instant reference for all platoon members.
- ☐ It facilitates the integration of new soldiers.
- ☐ It ensures critical combat tasks, such as precombat inspections and radar maintenance, are considered.

A good SOP addresses: Maintenance and recovery, vehicle load plans, actions on contact, assembly area procedures, tactical movement, preparing for combat, local security, prisoner of war handling, reporting, surveillance and security operations, security readiness conditions, troop leading procedures, platoon organization, succession of command, offensive and defensive mission planning, critical items accountability, logistics and supply, passage of lines, and radar site selection and preparation. This list is not all inclusive since each SOP addresses each platoon's additional specific needs.

Lane training offers an excellent opportunity to validate the platoon SOP. Lessons learned from the

lane demonstrate what must be added to, changed, or deleted from the SOP. The platoon must use its SOP on the training lane and whenever it is in a simulated combat environment.

Summary

Planning and executing effective training is a challenge. Since there are many ways to train, doctrine allows us to use many ways to achieve our training goals. Because we have found it so effective, we offer this lane training approach as a model to new platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. The lane trains to sustain proficiency and to challenge soldiers. It is performance oriented, and makes junior leaders the primary trainers.

While we only touched on the development of a platoon SOP, this is an important part of achieving and maintaining combat readiness. Used together, a comprehensive SOP and a realistic lane training program greatly improve the GSR platoon's performance of all its tasks.

Captain Michael J. Colarusso is a graduate of St. John's University in New York. His previous assignments include brigade BICC officer, tank battalion S2, GSR platoon leader, and intelligence training officer in the G2 section of the 1st Infantry Division (M).

Staff Sergeant Richard L. Sigler is an assistant operations NCO in the S3 section, 101st MI Battalion. Previous assignments include GSR platoon sergeant, NCOIC of Radar Site 6, B Company, and REMBASS/GSR instructor at the Intelligence Center. He is a graduate of BITC and ANCOB.

Training for an NTC Rotation

A Direct Support MI Company Team Perspective

by Captain Mark R. Wallace

Training your unit for an NTC rotation can be a jarring emotional experience—especially if you've never been in charge before. If you're in a FORSCOM unit though, you could very well face this situation. Last March and June, the 1st Infantry Division deployed two brigade task forces to the NTC. To support each rotation, the 101st MI Bat-

talion deployed a direct support (DS) MI company team. This article describes both an effective training technique and the rigorous train-up that prepared Alpha Team to support the 1st Brigade's rotation.

Alpha Team's mission was to provide the intelligence and electronic warfare support that would allow the commander to see the battlefield and target the enemy. Figure 1 shows Alpha Team's or-

ganization, which is identical to the DS MI company team that deployed last March and June, except that QUICKFIX did not deploy. This compact, highly mobile force proved to be an effective combat multiplier.

The NTC rotation was the premier training event of the 3d quarter of fiscal year 1992. Not since the division returned from Southwest Asia in June had the company been able to deploy its equipment to the field. As usual, we used FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 as the cornerstone for our preparation. Figure 2 shows the glide path we followed.

Using a crawl, walk, run approach, Alpha Team's train-up began in November of 1991 with a Company and Platoon Lanes. Our purpose was to assess the team's proficiency and to familiarize new key leaders with their respective positions.

The success, or failure, of a DS MI company team lies at the crew and team leader levels, so we began with the basics. All three collection and jam-

ming (C&J) platoons played a part: one played the evaluated platoon, another provided evaluator/controllers, and the third provided emitters to read scripted enemy radio traffic. The 3-day FTX began with a roll-out for the evaluated platoon. Platoon Lanes training focused on tactics and basic soldier skills.

Some of the METL tasks we keyed on were Select Sites; Coordinate Routes; Conduct Tactical Movement; Occupy Sites; Survive Direct/Indirect Fire; Report; Tip Off; Conduct Tasks; and Conduct ESM, ECM, and Transcription and Analysis Team Operations. Each task was performed to standard or we repeated that task until we met the standard.

Through a series of AARs, Platoon Lanes provided feedback on areas we needed to work on for upcoming major events. The Platoon Lanes also guided the update of our company METL. As a result, company leaders could concentrate garrison training on specific practiced or untrained




Figure 1. Alpha team's organization.




Figure 2. The glide path.

areas, and could direct our training to correct deficiencies before moving on.

Many of those individual, collective, and leader skills we relied on daily during Desert Storm eroded over time. Our training for the next month focused on correcting individual training deficiencies. To evaluate the training, we used a version of battle focused training through the discovery learning process. This methodology recognizes that leaders assess training at all levels and at all times during the hierarchy of tasks process and battle drills. Finally, leaders prepared an assessment for each event by identifying strengths and weaknesses. (For details on the Hierarchy of Tasks process see Major O'Connor's article.)

Before we finished the recovery process, we conducted a detailed platoon AAR to give soldiers feedback on their performance, to get their input, and to record written AAR comments and lessons learned. At the next company training meeting, we discussed the results and incorporated lessons learned into our training plan. This exacting process resulted in tough, realistic, challenging, battle-focused training.

The next field training exercise for the 2d Brigade was GAUNTLET. A division-directed battalion external evaluation, GAUNTLET is modeled after the NTC to prepare the brigade task force for its rotation. During GAUNTLET, Alpha Team sup-

ported the OPFOR. This was the first opportunity to get the entire company slice, complete with liaison team, in the field together. We focused on the METL tasks of command, control, communication, and intelligence (C³I). Figure 3 shows the three C³I supporting battle tasks and specific individual, collective, and leader tasks we trained. Again, using AARs, we further refined any individual, collective, and leader skills needing additional training.

We deployed the company to the field again for Platoon Lanes. This time we trained on crew drills to develop junior leaders capable of taking charge and executing the mission without orders. The emphasis here was on execution of the commander's intent. We gave the team chiefs a mission to execute, and assessed them on the mission's training plan and its execution. Armed with new leadership skills and increased confidence, the team was prepared for the 1st Brigade GAUNTLET in March.

The maneuver battalions executed Company Lanes before GAUNTLET, and Alpha Team deployed to provide jamming support and feedback on signal security to battalion task forces. Additionally, this exercise increased our ability to identify BLUEFORCE and OPFOR frequencies by "tuning" the operators' ears to friendly radio procedures before pitting their skills against an uncooperative OPFOR.

METL TASKS	BATTLE TASKS	SOLDIER/LEADER TASKS
C ³ I	IEWSE support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve cross-talk with LNO team. • Provide feedback on missions. • Track GSR status and location.
	Company team operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct troop leading procedures. • Report to brigade and battalion. • Issue warning order, FRAGOs, and OPORDs. • Conduct company team rehearsals.
	Platoon operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brief platoon OPORD to team chiefs. • Conduct troop leading procedures. • Establish and maintain communications.

Figure 3. Battle tasks and their individual, collective, and leader tasks.

A 2-week field exercise, 1st Brigade's GAUNTLET was identical to the scenario described earlier. This was our last opportunity, before deploying to the NTC, to correct any training deficiencies in the field. We focused on combined arms integration and synchronization. We further refined each team member's duties and responsibilities and verified the company field SOPs. We rigidly followed the same system of daily AARs throughout the exercise.

The last stage of predeployment NTC training was an intensive series of garrison training sessions to teach those critical individual, collective, and leader tasks needed for NTC success. To be certified for deployment, soldiers had to have completed this training within the past 6 months.

We developed tasks, conditions, and standards for each skill. The individual and collective training programs had 12 critical tasks:

- ☐ Preparation for overseas movement processing.
- ☐ Mail handling.
- ☐ Fuel handling.
- ☐ NTC safety.
- ☐ Desert and hot weather training.
- ☐ Family member briefing.
- ☐ OPFOR tactics and vehicle identification.
- ☐ Vehicle preparation.
- ☐ Rail load training.
- ☐ Driver certification.
- ☐ Call for fire.
- ☐ Combat lifesaver.

The NCO certification program had nine critical leader tasks:

- ☐ Certify preventive maintenance checks and services.
- ☐ Conduct land navigation.
- ☐ Conduct inspections before and during combat operations.

- ☐ Prepare a range card.
- ☐ Establish troop leading procedures.
- ☐ Establish NBC procedures.
- ☐ Zero MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System).
- ☐ Construct individual fighting positions.
- ☐ Monitor combat service support activities before, during, and after combat operations.

In addition to the training we executed, training assistance from outside was available. Sponsored by G2 Training, two 98Cs (Communications Intelligence Analyst) were sent to the RED THRUST OPFOR Mobile Training Team (MTT) block of instruction. The battalion technical control and analysis element provided some technical classes for our 98Cs and 98Gs (Voice Intercept Operator). These included terrain orientation, electronic preparation of the battlefield, and an excellent 2-day traffic analysis exercise using actual traffic intercepted during previous rotations.

In late May, a combat-ready Alpha Team deployed to the NTC and performed successfully during the rotation. We used this train-up program as well as FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 to apply lessons learned, and we were able to make great strides in preparing for the NTC experience. Some important lessons we learned are that—

- ☐ There is no substitute for company team and platoon operations orders and rehearsals.
- ☐ Key leaders must attend all task force operations orders and rehearsals.
- ☐ It is essential to position key leaders at critical points on the battlefield.

To correct deficiencies identified at NTC, Alpha Company will conduct another iteration of Platoon Lanes. This training cycle will prepare us for another GAUNTLET as well as MI Gunnery this August. If the formula holds true, the company will be at peak proficiency after this training.

By using a methodical approach, you reduce the trauma of preparing for an NTC rotation. Remember, your NTC rotation continues after redeployment; use this technique to view NTC as a circle. To complete the loop, correct the deficiencies identified at the NTC by tying your strengths and weak-

nesses back into your future training program.

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Fighting and Winning at the NTC

by Major Duane C. Young

Anyone desiring a "silver bullet" solution to winning at the NTC is going to be disappointed. As a review of the voluminous literature on lessons learned at the NTC clearly shows, the solution to winning is complex and requires strict adherence to, and tenacious execution of, approved U.S. Army doctrine.

This article addresses only a few of the issues related to winning at the NTC, specifically—

- ☐ Effective use of reconnaissance and intelligence.
- ☐ Counterreconnaissance and surveillance.
- ☐ Staff coordination, including the S2-S3 relationship.

As we look for solutions to winning at the NTC, we need to ask ourselves some hard questions.

Effective Use of Reconnaissance and Intelligence

Reconnaissance is a combat multiplier of the first order. I became convinced of this truth when I observed rotational unit (BLUEFORCE) performance at the NTC. A more official confirmation is issued in the form of the Rand Corporation's October 1987 study on tactical reconnaissance.¹ The Rand study reports that commanders affirm that good reconnaissance is as valuable to their warfighting effort as at least one, and probably two, companies or teams would be. Clearly, the answers to the following questions will help improve our reconnaissance prowess.

1. How well do we use our dedicated reconnaissance assets to acquire information?

We must use great care in selecting when, where, and how we use our limited reconnaissance assets. All commanders know we have more than just scouts to employ, but they rarely think beyond the GSR team or the "national systems" in the G2's kit bag. Why can't an electronic warfare team on hill XYZ look outside their shelter with a pair of binoculars and add a SALUTE report to their tactical report? Or a QUICKFIX pilot do the same from his ROZ box (restricted operating zone)? Do company commanders understand that some named areas of interest (NAIs) have to be covered by platoon leaders observing from battle positions? Every asset that can see and report allows the commander to save the scouts for critical missions.

2. Do we have a plan to reconstitute our reconnaissance assets?

We must make a conscious effort to husband our assets and to use them wisely in the reconnaissance effort, and possibly not all at once. We could copy the Soviet (Russian) model of a reconnaissance reserve. Arguably, he has a reserve because he has more assets than we do.² However, in reality, the first level of "Soviet" command where a unit exists which is thought of as a reserve is the division. The Soviet chief of staff retains the reconnaissance assault company and inserts it to fill gaps in the intelligence picture.

At lower levels, reserves are established by retaining some assets for use later, or assigning combat units to perform certain tasks, like that of a combat reconnaissance patrol. Not long ago the NTC OPFOR learned this lesson the hard way when it lost all its reconnaissance before a regimental attack, and ended the day reconnoiter-

ing the BLUEFORCE fire sacks by the "encounter" method. I was told the motor rifle division commander was understandably unhappy about this.

3. How well do we use our time?

As the Rand study points out, in deliberate attacks there is "...considerably greater time to accomplish the reconnaissance function."³ To what extent is profitable use made of this time? Time consumed in the laborious process of individual reconstitution of the unit's scout platoon from the previous battle is precious time lost. Critical NAs go uncovered, combat power is lost needlessly (including scouts), and so the cycle goes.

A "Movement to Contact" mission provides one example of how to break this cycle. The task force commander determines there is not enough space or time for scouts to advance, using stealth, to secure advantageous positions along the axis of advance to observe and report enemy contact. The commander wants to hold the scouts in reserve for follow-on missions, so he directs the platoon to penetrate slowly on a flank and report any follow-on forces they detect.

Instead of using the scout platoon at the head of the task force, the commander forms a fighting patrol (mounted point element) from one or more mechanized or tank sections or platoons. The patrol moves forward on the axis of advance to secure the force and act as a base of fire for the advance guard or main body to maneuver or when contact is made. Since the commander wants to provide security for his force, and he believes reconnaissance is as valuable as one or two company teams on the objective, detaching one platoon to provide this security is worth the effort. And the scouts survive to launch immediately into the follow-on mission.

Counterreconnaissance and Surveillance

4. Does the defensive plan incorporate these three basic phases of counterreconnaissance and surveillance?⁴

Infiltration and insertion prevention. Use a "screen line" out to our front of ground and air defense assets, supported by indirect fire and electronic warfare means. Orient the line on likely avenues developed in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, and be well briefed on the plan.

Position detection. Someone will always get through; and those who do, must be found. Do we have a plan which integrates—

- ☐ Electronic detection (direction finding).
- ☐ Mounted, dismounted, and aerial terrain

sweeps.

- ☐ Chance encounters—soldiers must always remain alert on the battlefield.
- ☐ Other means, such as prisoner interrogation (when allowed).

Countermeasures. Finding the enemy is only half the battle. Do we have a plan integrating fire support, aerial assets, and reaction forces to destroy the detected enemy? Remember, sometimes a "soft kill" can be effective enough. Does our plan also include the possible use of smoke or jamming, although these are finite resources? I recall one BLUEFORCE commander who smoked the entire central corridor for the better part of a day as he prepared his defense. Our OPFOR scouts couldn't see the preparation, and we were frantic. However, the smoke ran out just before sundown, and we received a sufficiently accurate picture of all that had been done that day.

5. How do we use our assets in the counter-reconnaissance fight?

Scouts can vector combat units to counter enemy reconnaissance elements, but they shouldn't carry the burden of the fight. Scouts destroyed in this manner are not alive the next day to pick up the enemy forward of our positions and to report his every move. The OPFOR skillfully integrates "scouts," GSR, and the electronic warfare direction finding capability to vector motorized rifle platoons to find and destroy BLUEFORCE reconnaissance.

6. Has our S3, S2, and fire support officer worked out an integrated reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan and fire plan to assist in inserting our patrols in the offense?

Flares are used to guide patrols, thereby saving time on orientation. (The OPFOR knows we're coming anyway, they heard it on our A/L (administrative/logistics radio net). High explosives and smoke help penetrate OPFOR screen lines. (This is the counter-counterreconnaissance fight.)

Staff Coordination, Including the S2-S3 Relationship

7. Who owns the IPB process?

Our commander does, because if he doesn't, we have already lost. Often, commanders ignore intelligence when it contradicts plans already drawn up solely from the situational template, not the OPFOR. The motorized rifle regiment commander selects one of several preplanned mission options. He does this only after the S2 gives him and the battalion commander the "Intelligence Update," about two and a half hours before line of departure time.

8. Are division and brigade collection plans generated and disseminated timely?

Division and brigade collection plans must answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements. Therefore, they drive the location of our listening and observation posts and the direction of patrols from our mechanized and light infantry companies, GSRs, and scouts.

9. Does the S2's R&S plan integrate the location and direction of listening and observation posts, patrols, GSRs, scouts, fire support team vehicles, and subordinate units? Do the commander and S3 make sure subordinate commanders heed the S2?

Some suggest we take the R&S plan from the S2 and give it to the S3. We did not do that with fire support. To make sure company commanders do a fire plan, we gave them fire support teams. By the same logic, we ought to give them an intelligence NCO or liaison officer from the S2 section. It is cheaper for the task force commander to make sure company commanders know they must heed his S2.

10. Are R&S plans passed to the next higher headquarters for review and integration?

Brigade can integrate plans to ensure there are no gaps, or redirect assets to cover if there are. Division can do the same, and possibly assign new assets (reconnaissance reserves) to cover gaps.

11. Do the S2, scout platoon leader, GSR team leader, and MI company commander attend all rehearsals?

They do in the OPFOR. They operate as an integrated team with the maneuver commanders, which is one reason they succeed in providing the OPFOR commander the information he needs. Motor rifle battalion commanders know the MI company often means the difference between success and failure, and they require that MI company personnel attend rehearsals.

Conclusion

As stated earlier, I did not intend to exhaust the subject of winning at the NTC (or anywhere else). All of these suggestions do not apply to every rotation either. For example, division command and control elements only deploy for contingency operations at the NTC.

The purpose here is to get people thinking and talking. As we approach an uncertain future with an "itty-bitty army," the old saws about fighting outnumbered and winning and the need for a well trained Army take on a new and more urgent aspect. We have been told not to worry, there will be plenty of warning time in the future. Noted. Are NTC rotations "no notice?" Perhaps the bottom line is that we need to consider how we use the warning time we are given, including for NTC rotations.

Endnotes

1. Martin Goldsmith and James Hodges, **Applying the National Training Center Experience: Tactical Reconnaissance** (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1987).

2. Indeed, at the MRR (brigade) level, we actually have equal assets. There are 17 vehicles and 1 GSR in an MRR. In a 3-task-force brigade we have 18 scout vehicles, and can usually count on having a GSR squad with 4 systems in it, giving us 22 systems. Even in a 2-battalion brigade, we would have 12 to 15 systems. The Russian has taken the same number of assets and made more and smaller units, increasing the available leadership. We should consider this as we look at 10-vehicle scout platoons for battalions. Would we be better off if we increased the number of leaders and made these 10- to 12-vehicle reconnaissance companies?

3. Goldsmith, 10.

4. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of counterreconnaissance draws heavily from the article of a colleague and former officer in my S2 section at the NTC. See Guaglianone, David, "Countersurveillance Operations," **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin**, January-March 1992.

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LRS Unit METL Training The JTF-6 Solution

By Captain Christopher Paul McPadden

What would you call a long-range surveillance (LRS) mission that trains the majority of an LRS

unit's METL in 1 month and is virtually cost free? The answer is a counter-drug mission under Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6). If your goal is to train LRS units for combat, JTF-6 missions offer great opportunities and many benefits.

JTF-6 missions provide superb battle focused

training. Of the 63 METL tasks our LRS unit trains, we can train 46 in a single JTF-6 mission—that is 75 percent. Our unit trains these tasks during the four phases of an LRS mission: Predeployment, deployment, conduct operations, and redeployment. The unit can easily train the rest of the tasks in lane training and other (STXs) during the year.

JTF-6 missions include surveillance or reconnaissance and fall right into line with the doctrinal LRS missions of surveillance, reconnaissance, battle damage assessment, and target acquisition. As well as training doctrinal missions, JTF-6 builds the unit's versatility by providing a variety of environments to train these missions in.

These missions are off-post training exercises and, therefore, isolated; they afford the opportunity to conduct other intensive training as well. Teams can execute this training between missions. During our recent JTF-6 mission, we brought with us two medics who taught our teams the Combat Lifesaver Course. We came away from the mission with all 24 team members combat lifesaver qualified. We also trained with the law enforcement agency on tracking and countertracking techniques which included a practical exercise. Also, we conducted live fire ranges with the M16. As a result, we were able to get in some great training, which has made our teams more proficient in these important tasks.

"JTF-6 missions give the company and teams a realistic operational mission."

JTF-6 missions give the company and teams a realistic operational mission. All our team leaders have had NTC training and they say the JTF-6 missions training is superior to NTC training for LRS teams. JTF-6 missions are conducted in a real-world environment and they focus on assisting national counter-drug efforts. From deployment to redeployment, the company and teams do just what they would do for a real combat mission. As a result, our unit maintains real combat effectiveness.

This training also allows us to use multiple communication systems and, depending on the mission location, definitely provides communication challenges. We use a detailed communications plan to maintain redundant and continuous communications. In three JTF-6 missions, we trained on HF (AM), FM (PRC 77s, 126s, and whisper mikes), satellite communications, civilian hand-held radios, and cellular telephones. Although, maintaining the HF has been challenging, we have had great suc-

cess. With varied communication systems and the requirement for detailed and timely reporting, our teams have become skillful in communications.

"Short of real combat, the ultimate challenge is mission execution."

These realistic operational missions and the communications training have helped our teams become technically and tactically proficient. These missions also teach us to provide timely responses to priority intelligence requirements and specific information requirements. In combat, this means giving accurate and timely data to the command group so the commander has the most accurate information possible on which to base decisions.

From predeployment to redeployment, JTF-6 missions challenge and prepare soldiers. Included in these missions are STXs, legal briefs on the Posse Comitatus, and day and night live fire maneuver ranges to train Break Contact drills. All of these build team integrity, proficiency, intensity, and confidence. We also conduct mission briefs and team isolation. At the 2-hour brief-backs, the soldiers use sterile maps to describe by memory exactly what they're going to do on the mission.

Short of real combat, the ultimate challenge is mission execution, which is followed by an intensive debrief. Operational security is always a concern since even a slight violation can compromise the entire mission.

JTF-6 missions also develop unit cohesion and flexibility through cross-training. We cross-train when successive missions cover the same named area of interest. We then have team members rotate positions. This type of training builds motivation and confidence in junior soldiers and prepares them to be future LRS leaders. Soldiers develop flexibility as they learn to adapt to unpredictable changes and continue their mission.

Besides the training value, soldiers gain a real sense of purpose, commitment, and contribution because they're doing a real-world mission exactly the way they would in a combat environment. They are also serving their country in the war against drugs. These LRS missions support the counter-drug effort through JTF-6 and provide a great opportunity to focus the efforts of our superb soldiers into realistic and meaningful training.

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The S2 and Light Infantry Scouts

by Captain Joseph H. Grable

When Moses sent them to spy out the land of Canaan, he said to them, 'go up there into the Negev; then go up into the hill country, and see what the land is like, whether the people who live in it are strong or weak, whether they are few or many. And how is the land in which they live, is it good or bad? And how are the cities in which they live, are they like open camps or with fortifications?'

Numbers 13:16-19

The scout platoon can be the most vital intelligence gathering asset for the light infantry battalion commander. However, scouts are not always used to their fullest, often because the battalion S2 fails to understand two key functions:

- ☐ The role of the S2 in relation to the scout platoon.
- ☐ The missions, training, and techniques of scout platoon operations.

My purpose here is to clarify the S2's role in light infantry scout operations and to suggest a training and operational plan that would make optimal use of the scout platoon's unique abilities. I will address seven subtopics:

- ☐ Scout platoon missions.
- ☐ The S2-scout relationship.
- ☐ Scout personnel.
- ☐ Techniques for training.
- ☐ Operations and sustainment.
- ☐ Effective communications plans.
- ☐ The sniper section.

An S2 who has a full grasp of applied doctrine in these areas can recommend appropriate training and operations for the scout platoon. This will greatly increase the effectiveness of the scouts as a combat multiplier.



Scout Platoon Missions

Something hidden. Go and find it. Go and look behind the Ranges. Lost and waiting for you. Go!

Rudyard Kipling

The S2 must first understand the scout platoon's capabilities. Exactly what missions can it accomplish? And what are its limitations? To answer these questions we must examine the scout platoon's composition and the use and misuse of this valuable asset.

At full strength, a light infantry scout platoon has 19 soldiers:

- ☐ Three squads of five scouts each—a staff sergeant squad leader, a sergeant assistant squad leader, and three observer/recorders.
- ☐ A headquarters section of four scouts—a

platoon leader, a platoon sergeant, and two radio operator/drivers.¹

The scout platoon's primary missions are route, zone, and area reconnaissance. They also perform screen and guard missions to support battalion security operations. Operating between 2 and 8 kilometers from the battalion, the scouts are the eyes and ears of the battalion commander. (FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion* covers all aspects of the scout platoon.)

Scouts are often used in movement control, liaison/contact, quartering parties, demolitions, chemical reconnaissance, and security for COLT, REMBASS, or ground surveillance radar teams. However, these assignments take them away from their **primary** missions. This degrades the battalion's security and ability to take the initiative. "**Scouts are finders, not fighters.**"² It is important that the S2 not recommend the scout platoon for non-scout missions that any infantry platoon could perform.

An involved and knowledgeable S2 will not task the scouts beyond their capabilities. These are some practical limitations to the scouts' primary missions:

- ☐ Expect dismounted scouts to move cross-country at an average of 2 to 3 kilometers per hour, 1 kilometer per hour in snow or extremely limited visibility, and even slower if actively engaged in area reconnaissance.
- ☐ Scouts can reconnoiter a maximum of three routes simultaneously (one per squad).
- ☐ Time allotted for zone reconnaissance should be gauged by the roughness of the terrain, visibility, and lines of sight afforded by terrain and vegetation.
- ☐ In screen operations, scouts can man a maximum of three observation points continuously, and up to six for 36 hours.
- ☐ Scouts have to be reinforced with additional personnel and crew-served weapons for guard missions and for screen missions in thick vegetation or rough terrain.
- ☐ Scouts need to resupply at least every 5 days in good conditions, and at least every 3 days in Arctic and desert climates. This depends on the mission and the feasibility of placing caches.
- ☐ To maintain the integrity of their operations, scouts may temporarily discontinue communications with the battalion tactical operations center (TOC), or anyone else. This is why communications windows are necessary.
- ☐ A scout platoon operating at less than 100

percent strength becomes more significantly degraded in its capabilities soldier-for-soldier than does the regular line platoon.

Limitations aside, scouts usually possess capabilities above those of the average light infantryman, provided the recruitment process is exclusive. Normally, scouts are more physically fit than their peers and can move farther, faster, and with a heavier load. Scouts can operate without constant supervision and are highly proficient at navigation and field craft. In the absence of constant communications or if the platoon is heavily attrited, scouts can continue the mission on their own.

Scout leaders are Ranger qualified and able to insert teams by boat, airmobile, helicopter rappel, and parachute (in airborne battalions). Other skills include bridge classification, sniper operations, demolition, fast rope technique, sapper operations, mountaineering, escape and evasion, and wilderness survival. S2s who fully understand scout missions and capabilities can build a solid working relationship with scout leaders.

"The S2-scout relationship has much more potential than is usually realized."

The S2-Scout Relationship

For they fought a very strong battle in the confidence of their own strength and the people above them.

Homer, The Iliad

The S2-scout relationship has much more potential than is usually realized. Some think the S2-scout relationship involves nothing more than the S2 recommending to the S3 or commander how to use the scouts to satisfy priority intelligence requirements (PIR). This misconception persists because, without a solid understanding of scout operations, this is all a typical S2 **can** do; in fact, many S2s never fully exploit the potential of this relationship. Nevertheless, the scout platoon remains the battalion's primary intelligence tool, so the function of the battalion's only intelligence officer must go much further than simply recommending.

The S2 should be the scouts primary point of contact at the battalion. FM 7-20 states, the S2 "coordinates reconnaissance requirements with the S3, who supervises the scout platoon during its conduct of operations." Although, the S3 tasks the

scouts and controls their activities on the battlefield, it is the S2 who is best suited to—

- ☐ Brief scout leaders on mission requirements and purpose.
- ☐ Provide any pertinent data on the enemy situation.
- ☐ Coordinate the communications and reporting plan with them.
- ☐ Receive their reports.
- ☐ Analyze their reports.
- ☐ Debrief them when they return.
- ☐ Digest combat information into intelligence for the commander.

Also, it is the S2 who recommends the mission in the first place. As a combat support element, the scouts are an **intelligence** asset. Therefore, it is only fitting that the S2 be the battalion's point of contact with the scouts. The S2 must become the battalion's resident expert on scout operations and "sell" these functions to the commander. It behooves the S2 to thoroughly understand the Army's doctrine on scouts and their missions and training plans. The S2 must be involved with the S3 and the scout platoon leader to coordinate ongoing platoon training and operations. This involvement constitutes the S2-scout relationship.

To get involved in scout training, S2s may have to get their hands dirty. They have to be present at each juncture in the training cycle. An involved S2 will—

- ☐ Assess, along with the S3 and the platoon leader, the scout platoon's strengths and weaknesses in its critical wartime operations, then recommend improvement training.
- ☐ Help the platoon leader resource training, and be there when it's conducted. This is the S2's usual role as TOC contact for the platoon.
- ☐ Spend time on the ground with the scout teams, not in a supervisory role, but simply to get the feel for how scouts operate and what physical challenges they face.
- ☐ Be there when the platoon is evaluated.

What does all of this accomplish? The answer, for the scout platoon, is that it—

- ☐ Builds familiarity and a positive working relationship with the staff officer who is its main point of contact during operations.
- ☐ Results in a more complete and better resourced training event.
- ☐ Adds another perspective in evaluating the scout platoon's effectiveness.

A solid S2-scout relationship ensures that scouts are given missions that match their critical wartime operations and capabilities. More important, it lets

the S2 see how the scouts operate, identify their strengths and weaknesses, and get to know each of their leaders. Such experience and knowledge are vital when recommending the scouts for missions later on, and it also helps the S2 analyze their reports.

When conducting battalion external evaluations, ARTEPs, Joint Readiness Training Center rotations, or actual combat operations, S2s put their relational experience with the scouts to the test. Because now that they know the platoon's capabilities and peculiarities, they can recommend the appropriate missions that will meet the commander's intelligence requirements. Because S2s know the platoon's leaders, they know they'll be understood when they brief them on the upcoming mission. When S2s are familiar with the platoon's modus operandi, they have excellent communication with it and can gain maximum intelligence from its reports. The S2-scout relationship is more than just a matter of passing academic interest, it is **vital** to the platoon's success in satisfying the commander's PIR.

"The scout platoon needs the battalion's best soldiers, led by the best leaders."

Scout Personnel

So the sons of Dan sent from their family five men out of their whole number, valiant men...to spy out the land and to search it.

Judges 18:2

The selection process for scouts must be improved. Even if the S2 has a great relationship with the scouts, team effectiveness will suffer if scouts aren't selected wisely. A building's design can be flawless, but it can come crashing down because of poor materials; the same is true for the scout platoon, whose arduous missions test even the best infantrymen.

The scout platoon needs the battalion's **best** soldiers, led by the **best** leaders. S2s need to make sure there's a good plan in place to get them into the scout platoon. A good plan starts with the platoon leader. Since the scout platoon leader's job is one of the most coveted by lieutenants in the battalion, a good suggestion is to let the battalion's yearly platoon tests, at least partially, determine who gets this post. Whatever the mechanism, battalion commanders normally choose one of their top lieutenants for this post without any help from

the S2. The command sergeant major does the same for the platoon sergeant's slot. That much is easy; the hard part is establishing a system that will consistently fill other platoon slots with the best soldiers, without alienating company commanders.

All too often, when line company commanders are asked to give up some of their soldiers to the scout platoon, they are only too eager to cast off those who are a particular nuisance; they don't want to give up their brightest and best. One way to get around this is to have the scout platoon leader and the platoon sergeant screen incoming junior NCOs and enlisted. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant could select soldiers with the experience and ability the scout platoon needs. Scout selectees would then be staffed through the command sergeant major and coordinated through the S1 for placement in the platoon.

This plan would provide a steady flow of talented replacements into the platoon. In addition, it avoids putting company commanders and first sergeants on the spot. If the S2 or the scout platoon leader gets the plan endorsed by the commander, the platoon will be way ahead in terms of getting quality scout personnel.

Techniques for Training

Training is everything. The peach was once a bitter almond; cauliflower is nothing but a cabbage with a college education.

Mark Twain

The platoon leader, along with the S3 and the battalion commander, trains scouts; however, the S2 plays a prominent role as a facilitator, participant, and observer. Training management for the platoon begins and ends with an assessment of proficiency levels of its critical wartime operations. **The best way to assess the scouts is to conduct an external platoon evaluation.** The S2 should suggest to the S3 and the commander that this be done yearly, if possible. Lacking formal evaluations, the S3, S2, and the platoon leader can assess the platoon during a brainstorming session, using records of other recent training events, such as battalion external evaluations, ARTEP results, or platoon training after action reviews (AARs).

Once the assessment is made, the S3, S2, and the platoon leader determine which collective tasks need more training. Then the S2 recommends **battalion** planned and resourced training which, along with platoon leader training, will bring the platoon up to standard. S3s will probably be more than happy to pass this action on to the S2, since they usually have more than enough work to do already.

By this time, S2s thoroughly understand scout

missions and capabilities. Now they can recommend a good situation training exercise, using **ARTEP 7-92-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Scout Platoon/Squad and Sniper Team.** They can get the needed resources, including evaluators, staffed through the S3 section. With their new appreciation of the scouts, S2s can provide them with a realistic and interesting enemy scenario and a professionally constructed objective area, complete with an OPFOR.

During battalion planned training, S2s should—

- ☐ Assume their normal role of the platoon's point of contact in the battalion TOC.
- ☐ Establish communications windows and use report formats just as they would during battalion level operations for combat.
- ☐ Be available to help platoon leaders with platoon level training as needed.
- ☐ Be present at all AARs to soak up lessons learned, to make further assessments of the platoon's training status, and to offer the OPFOR perspective on the mission's success.

If S2s are to have a positive influence on scout training, they must have a good working relationship with the scout platoon leader. The relationship should be symbiotic, with the result that the platoon leader gets a quality training environment and a staff contact who understands the scouts, and the S2 gets a well-trained intelligence asset whose communications and reporting methods always work.

Principles for Operations and Sustainment

For I was wet, had no clothes to shift me, nor anything to eat or drink to comfort me, neither did I see any prospect before me but that of perishing with hunger or being devoured by wild beasts.

Robinson Crusoe

Operations, in peace or war, should be a natural extension of training. The S2's role is the same for operations as it is for training. The S2 can recommend principles and techniques for operations and sustainment which add significantly to the scouts' success, such as—

1. **Appropriate tasking.** Light infantry scouts are often overtasked or tasked with improper missions that take them away from their ability to conduct reconnaissance and security operations for the commander. **FM 7-20** states, "Scouts should concentrate on the most important information requirements—they **should not** be overtasked."³ (No emphasis added.) If S2s have a good working

relationship with scout leadership and are an integral part of scout training, they won't make these mistakes when they recommend scout operations to the battalion commander's S3.

2. The avoidance of engagement. "Scouts can engage the enemy with indirect fire but must avoid direct fire battles (except in self defense). Elements that become involved in direct fire engagements usually stop watching their designated areas...."⁴ The other exception to this rule is when scouts are used in a guard mission and have been reinforced with additional infantrymen and crew-served weapons.

3. Early deployment. When the battalion receives a mission, it's usually time sensitive. In this case, the scouts need to move toward their objective quickly to get the information commanders need **before** they execute plans. The S2 should recommend the scouts be issued a fragmentary order to begin reconnaissance when the battalion receives the warning order. Although the scouts may not have details of the plan, the order allows them to get a jump on their reconnaissance mission. This plan is well suited to a battalion deliberate attack.

4. Use of forward supply caches. Nothing hampers the scouts' ability to conduct continuous operations like being tied to the rear logistic tail. Scouts should be resupplied forward of the battalion's forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), to give them maximum freedom to conduct reconnaissance. The tactical SOP should indicate who is responsible for resupplying them, although usually it's the headquarters company executive officer.

The resupply effort is a tactical decision and requires the S3's approval to move forward of the battalion. Therefore, scouts will use their normal reporting net, during a regular communications window using predesignated code words and locations. The administrative and logistic net is almost always a dead end for the scouts.

The scouts should have a working resupply plan in place. If they don't, S2s can recommend that the platoon leader coordinate with the S2 and the company executive officer for a series of cache points and drop-off methods, along with appropriate call signs, frequencies, and code words. They can predesignate specific times to conduct resupply. If necessary, the scout platoon leader or sergeant can call in resupply missions to the S2 via the intelligence net (or whatever net they normally use). The S2 clears the mission with the S3 and passes it along to the Headquarters and Headquarters Company executive officer for execution.

Aerial resupply works for scouts on a zone

reconnaissance or other "deep" mission. But, because of the fickleness of aircraft operability, it must always be accompanied by an alternate plan. Usually, it's sufficient to cache supplies at a predesignated point near the battalion's frontline trace for the platoon sergeant to pick up. Whatever the plan, it must be a standard operating procedure, or well coordinated **before** the scouts move out.

5. Casualty evacuation. Scout's forward deployment precludes the use of normal casualty evacuation channels. "To offset this problem, thorough coordination with maneuver units near the dispersed unit is required. Maneuver units can help the scouts by evacuating casualties from forward of the FEBA to preplanned casualty collection points...."⁵ Each scout squad should have one combat lifesaver-trained member. S2s can facilitate emergency evacuation of casualties the same way they facilitate resupply missions. (This is another reason to have well-planned resupply procedures.)

Effective Communications Plans

I don't care how much a man talks, if only he says it in a few words.

Josh Billings

Scouts must be proficient in communications. A scout platoon can be expert in stealth and able to find out all there is to know about the enemy, but even the most detailed sketch of enemy objectives is useless unless it is relayed back to the commander. Here again, the S2 plays a vital role as the scouts' contact in the TOC. The S2 knows them and has precoordinated a communications plan with them.

The S2 is the link between the commander's need for information and the scouts' need to tailor reporting requirements to their ground movement plan. **As stated earlier, because of the nature of scout operations, the scout platoon leader may lose communications with the TOC, or anyone else for that matter.** Sometimes, it's just not practical for the scouts to keep a headquarters or communications element perched on top of a hill waiting to respond to the TOC watch officer's latest whim. For platoon leaders, nothing is worse than being asked for an immediate situation report while they're within spitting distance of an enemy objective.

These situations can be avoided if the S2 has established communication windows with the scouts. For example, the scouts could be required to come up on the battalion intelligence net every 6 hours at specified times to pass traffic or to just make a communications check with the S2. They

may come up on the net to pass "hot" information any time; but the S2, S3, and commander will get a situation report at least four times a day. The scouts are free to move platoon elements through low ground or to put a maximum number of eyes on the objective. Should the scouts miss successive communications windows, the S2 will know they are in trouble and precoordinated contingencies will go into affect. Of course, this kind of trust requires scouts proficient in operating radios, and using and fabricating field-expedient, long-range antennae and basic signal theory.

What if the commander needs detailed information about an objective which is difficult to transmit with normal report formats. An example is area reconnaissance in support of a battalion attack on an enemy strong-point defense. Company commanders need to know specific locations of enemy weapon systems, obstacles, and reinforcement avenues of approach. Although scouts can get this detailed information, it's hard to describe without a sketch drawn to scale. Usually, the scout platoon leader doesn't have time to return to the TOC, sketch in hand, before company commanders need the information.

A great solution is to use a grid matrix report format, like the one in the illustration. Using identical copies of the grid, the scouts send the S2 a bird's eye view of the objective by correlating objects on

the ground with grid coordinates sent over the radio. For example, "Heavy machine gun: alpha point six and four points three, pointing azimuth 172 degrees." The sender starts the transmission with the grid's scale and the location of the grid matrix' center point. The receiver can draw an exact copy of the objective sketch on a grid and pass very accurate intelligence on to the commander. With practice, any scout can send the S2 accurate enough information to build a rough mock-up of the objective for rehearsals. This is an easy bit of "smart work" which yields results most commanders would give their eyeteeth for.


Snipers, Scouts, and the S2

*There was a little man, and he had a little gun,
And his bullets were made of lead, lead, lead;
He went to the brook, and saw a little duck,
and shot it through the head, head, head.*

Anonymous

Light infantry battalions are equipped with three M24 sniper systems, even though there's no allocation in the table of organization and equipment for snipers. Battalion commanders recognize the historic value of snipers as a combat multiplier in a light infantry environment. They are even willing to take seven soldiers "out of hide" to form three sniper teams around these systems, with one NCO trainer. How these teams are used and where they are assigned are different with each battalion, as is the S2's role in sniper operations.

In some battalions, rifle companies get the sniper systems,



and select two of their best marksmen to carry them. There are significant disadvantages to this, however. One is that the snipers' training focus is frittered away on other rifle company training objectives. Such an arrangement often finds the snipers sniping one day and being 60mm mortar ammunition bearers the next. Another disadvantage is snipers are not trained at a central point, together with other snipers by a sniper-qualified NCO. The training time and resources are not maximized. Another disadvantage is that sniper teams are most effective when working together against a common objective. **Unless they train together, on a regular basis, battalion commanders may get less than great results from their snipers.**

In other battalions, it is suggested that sniper systems be given to scout platoon soldiers to create a hybrid scout/sniper, thus eliminating the need to take soldiers from the battalion's TOC authorization. Scouts actively involved in sniping, however, are not available for scout missions. Sergeant First Class John Foley cites another problem with the hybrid scout/sniper: "If we tell a man in the morning to remain undetected at all costs and in the afternoon to concentrate on shooting somebody, we run the risk of ending up with a scout who fires when he shouldn't and a sniper who doesn't fire when he should."⁶

A better way to organize a sniper program is to choose them from a battalionwide marksmanship competition, and then assign them to train with the scout platoon under a competent, sniper-qualified NCO. Since many scout training objectives are identical to those of the snipers (stealth, field craft, camouflage), this arrangement works well. We get the most out of training resources, including time; there's a minimum of distractors; and scout platoon leaders can plan centrally.

Of what intelligence value are sniper teams? Another question answers the first. What do battalion commanders do with snipers during operations when there's no sniping mission? The answer is that they have three teams of experts in stealth, observation, and camouflage who, working in tandem with the scouts, add much to their S2's intelligence collection effort.

Besides recommending this method of assigning and training snipers, what role does the S2 play in their employment and training? For snipers to be used effectively, the battalion has to have a full-time sniper employment officer—someone who can communicate with and glean intelligence from them, and someone well versed in the tactical use of snipers. Who is better qualified to do this than the S2? The relationship between the S2 and the

sniper team is much the same as the relationship between the S2 and the scouts. Once S2s understand the doctrine on the use of snipers, they can recommend their missions to the S3 and the commander, and can act as the teams' contact point in the TOC.

In Summary

When they came back to their brothers at Zorah and Eshtaol, their brothers said to them, 'What do you report?' And they said, 'Arise, and let us go up against them; for we have seen the land, and behold, it is very good. And will you sit still? Do not delay to go, to enter, and to possess the land.'

Judges 18:8-9

Light infantry S2s must fully understand the potential of their role in relation to the scout platoon. They must become the battalion's resident expert on scout organization, training, and employment. Then, they will significantly increase the quantity and quality of tactical intelligence the commander needs. Clearly, while S2s don't have operational control of the scouts, they are in the best position to act as the scouts' point of contact on the battalion staff. S2s can help the scouts and the sniper section by—

- ☐ Recommending good personnel selection procedures.
- ☐ Adding realism and resources to training.
- ☐ Recommending tactically sound and feasible missions during operations.
- ☐ Establishing sound communications procedures.

This type of approach will make the most of the exceptional skills of the scouts and snipers.

Endnotes

1. FM 7-72, Light Infantry Battalion, 1-9.
2. FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, 7-27.
3. Ibid, 3-6.
4. Ibid, 4-9.
5. Ibid, Appendix F, 3.
6. Sergeant First Class John E. Foley, "Scouts, Snipers, and Designated Rifleman," *Infantry Magazine*, September-October 1990, 27.

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MI Battalion

Synchronization Matrix

Tactical Tool for the Commander and Staff

125th MI BN SYNCHRONIZATION

OPORD #

NAME

CORPS CDR's PIR/IR		DIVISION CDR's PIR/IR: PIR - 1. Will N. Bohol conduct a conventional crossborder invasion of S. Bohol? If so, when & where? 2. What are the threats to TAF and the natl port facility? 3. Will the PAB/SOF forces resist US/Aus NEO efforts? IR - 1. Will N. Bohol use chemical weapons against US/Aus forces to support a conventional attack? 2. How will the people of S. Bohol react to the intro of US/Aus forces? 3. What is the extent of local popular support in S. Bohol, for the N. Boholians and the PAB?		BATTALION MISSION: 125th MI BN conducts intelligence and electronic warfare operations in support of the 25th ID (L) NEO of US/Aus personnel and defense of key US/Aus facilities 302100Z Aug 92. o/o supports 25th ID (L) combat operations in order to maintain territorial integrity of S. Bohol.	
EVENT/PHASE		PHASE I			
ENEMY SITUATION/COA		Fwd mvmnt of enemy logistic supply points/AAs. N. Boholian army goes to alert status and disperses units. Increased AAA radar activity.		Increased activity vic airfield. Recon overflight of Tagbilaron airfield/natl port facility.	
DECISION POINTS		Possible mortar attacks on Tagbilaron airfields. Potential kidnappings/assassinations of US/Aus citizens/Boholian officials. Increased recon of Tagbilaron airfield/US embassy/Aus consulate/natl port facility.		Potential airstrike on Tagbilaron airfield.	
PHASE LINES		H+HR	H+2	H+4	H+5
TIME		290300 HRS	L	290700 HRS	L
PRIORITIES		291100 HRS		L	
TARGETS:		QF1	MAINT STANDBY		MAINT STANDBY
SUPPORTED UNIT:		QF2	STANDBY		MAINT STANDBY
		QF3	MAINT STANDBY		MAINT STANDBY
		QF4	ROTATED INTO THE CYCLE FOR 24HRS OPS		0300 ECM SEAD
GSR		GSS/CAV			
REMBASS		GSS/DREAR			
LLV/TRQ 32		C/VPW			
C/VPW		TRQ32			
QUICKFIX		QF			
PRIORITIES		PIR 2, IR 2		ADA, FIRE CONTROL, C2	
UNIT AO		CO TEAM			
3D BDE		C CO TEAM	EN ROUTE TO TAF		POC UP
DMAIN		LRSD			
DMAIN		TOC/TCAE	MACTAN AIRFIELD		
DREAR		HHS	MACTAN AIRFIELD		
SPECIAL COORDINATION		ROUTES	C MI Co/TM VIA		MICO/TM POC ESTABLISHED 1800Z
		LOCATIONS	SORTIES 1-10		3D BDE
		SECURITY			3D BDE
		MANEUVER POC	G4		S3/IEWSE
C2		JUMP CP	RETRANS DEPLOYS TO PINEAPPLE JUNC (1900Z)		RETRANS UP (2000Z)
		CTRL MEASURE	SEN DEPLOYS W/BN (1900Z)		SEN (G23) FULLY OPERATIONAL (2200Z)
		RETRANS			BACKBONE
		MSE NODES			MSE NETWORK UP 2400
REMARKS		Denotes coverage		COMMEX	
		MI CO/TM ASSETS DOWN FOR DEPLOYMENT		0300 ECM SEAD	
		TIME FIELD IS HAWAII LOCAL TIME. SUBFIELD TIMES ARE EXERCISE ZULU DIV SYNC MATRIX TIMES.		0600 SEAD END	

by Captain Timothy J. Moynihan

Maneuver commanders have used various operations matrixes since the advent of Combat Training Centers. They learned from experience at NTC, the Joint Readiness Training Center, and Hohenfels that the command estimate process had to be streamlined so that the end product would be easy to understand and execute. Today's maneuver

brigade S3, at the end of the command estimate process, may issue a doctrinal operations order (OPORD)/decision support template, an execution matrix, or a full-blown synchronization matrix. Divisional MI battalions and tactical exploitation battalions, because of the nature of their missions, don't produce anything like the maneuver synchronization matrix.

In the October-December 1991 MIPB, Colonel

MATRIX EFF DTG

BATTALION CDR's INTENT: My intent is to deploy MI and EW assets to support the division and maneuver Bde's concept of operations. Intelligence assets will initially be directed against enemy C ² and air defense fire support nets in an effort to collect intelligence and degrade the operations of the North Bohol Army (NBA) and the Peoples Army of Bohol (PAB). I want to be able to quickly shift the priority to battalion fire support nets, recon nets, and battalion and higher C ² nets. Success is achieved when enemy air defense fire support nets are isolated, C ² nets have been identified down to company level within conventional forces, and the SF/PAB organization is isolated.									
PHASE II									
Sniper activity in vicinity of Tagbilaron airfield, US embassy, Aus consulate, consolidated nickel mine.			Fwd stockpiling of CL IV & V			Increased recon (5th In Div) in vic MC 26.			
Increased sabotage on supply points and MSR. PAB/SOF activity VIC Tagbilaron intensifies.			Increased recon (9th Mech) vic AA1a: AA1b.			SOF/PAB have clear understanding of US AAA.			
Surveillance increased on US embassy/Aus consulate and Tagbilaron airfield.			Increased SA 7/11 SAM launches vic Tagbilaron airfield.			Increased MiG overflights of AA1: AA2.			
H+20 H+21	H+23	H+24	H+26	H+28	H+32	H+34	H+36		
292300 HRS	L 300300 HRS	L 300700 HRS	L 301100 HRS	L 301500 HRS					
MAINTSTANDBY		MAINTSTANDBY		MAINTSTANDBY		MAINT			
MAINTSTANDBY		MAINTSTANDBY		MAINTSTANDBY		MAINTSTANDBY			
STANDBY		MAINTSTANDBY		MAINTSTANDBY		MAINTSTANDBY			
		GSS DREAR CEASE OPS CI/IPW CEASE OPS		DREAR GSS UP 1900 CI/IPW UP		2130: TRQ 32 UP			
		• C ² NODES				• RECON, C ² , ADA, MORTARS			
		Cease ops, prep 1500 depart for sea move port		1900 arrive Bohol		2030: TOC/TCAE up vic DMAIN			
		Cease ops, prep 1500 depart for sea move port		1900 arrive Bohol		2030: Trains established vic DREAR			
		MAF to port facility LSH lift #3.				TOC/TCAE grid vic DMAIN.			
		MI CO TM assume QF C ² mission				HHS grid vic DREAR.			
		G4				G3/S2			
		QF reports critical reports to the MI CO TM POC				2030 deploy TRQ 32s to collection sites. 2130 TRQ 32s up. 2030 TOC/TCAE assumes QF C ² and reports.			

LEGEND

- AO area of operations
- C² command and control
- IPW prisoner of war interrogation
- CO TM company team
- COA course of action
- CP command post
- CTRL control
- ECM electronic countermeasures (jamming)
- EFF DTG effective date time group
- ESM electronic warfare support measures (collection)
- GSR ground surveillance radar
- HHS headquarters, headquarters support
- LLVI low-level voice intercept
- POC point of contact (IEWSO, S3)
- MNVR maneuver (MI battalion "maneuver" elements)
- MSE mobile subscriber equipment
- MSR main supply route
- QF1 QUICKFIX aircraft, #1
- vic vicinity
- REMBASS Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System

John Black and Captain David Ruddock introduced an intelligence synchronization matrix as a collection management tool for division and corps G2s. When developed alongside the maneuver synchronization matrix, the intelligence synchronization matrix fully integrates the collection and jamming plan with the maneuver plan. This allows the collection manager to prioritize asset tasks, so that now, the maneuver commander gets the right intelligence at the right time, instead of getting an intelligence dump that the S2/G2 has to wade through for pertinent intelligence.

Experienced maneuver S2s are accustomed to conducting the command estimate process as the OPFOR commander. During wargaming, the S2 doctrinally briefs OPFOR actions and reactions, while the maneuver S3 and the fire support officer (FSO) grind out branch plans and integrate maneuver and support operations and fire support. The final product—a maneuver synchronization matrix—is easier to read and execute than the OPORD. (Most subordinate commanders who get only an OPORD speed read through the information pertinent to their units without ever seeing how the battlefield “integrates.”)

MI battalion S3s, especially those with brigade or battalion S2 and company commander experience, can see the possibilities of the next step in MI mission planning—the MI battalion synchronization matrix. The intelligence synchronization matrix was the first step in this evolution.

Putting It All Together

The intelligence synchronization matrix is the MI battalion fire plan. It gives the MI commander collection and jamming “hit times,” a radio frequency spectrum high payoff target list, priority intelligence requirements (PIR)/information requirements (IR) objectives, and the G2’s intent. The intelligence synchronization matrix allows the MI battalion commander to focus the MI mission. When combined with the division synchronization matrix, the intelligence synchronization matrix establishes the MI battalion operational constraints and restraints (terrain, movement windows, combat service support, and communications issues).

The MI battalion S3 takes the information from both the division maneuver and intelligence synchronization matrixes and begins to fill in the MI battalion synchronization matrix, filling in the hit times first. Using backward planning, the S3 figures out which asset can make the hit time and what it will take to get that asset at the right place. Identifying the PIR/IR objectives, the S3 does the same kind of planning for long range surveillance detach-

ment (LRSD), counterintelligence (CI), and imagery intelligence (IMINT) assets. The S3 can now figure out where and when the tactical operations center (TOC)/technical control and analysis element (TCAE), MI company/teams, general support assets, and support elements need to be to accomplish the mission and all the coordination along the way.

The entire MI battalion battle staff should produce the MI battalion synchronization matrix the same way the maneuver battle staff produces the maneuver synchronization matrix. The S3 runs the wargaming, the S2 is the OPFOR commander (trying to strip away the divisional eyes and ears under MI battalion control), and the TCAE chief is the electronic warfare FSO. When there’s time for more detailed wargaming, other battle staff personnel can be added: S3 air; chemical officer; battalion signal officer; and representatives of S1/S4, HUMINT, LRSD, IMINT, special operations forces, echelons above divisions, and echelons above corps.

Operations in direct support of maneuver brigades require input from their respective intelligence and electronic warfare support officers (IEWSOs). This can be a problem since the MI battalion and the maneuver brigades conduct mission planning simultaneously. Nevertheless, an experienced IEWSO can quickly grasp the maneuver concept of the operation and fax a draft maneuver matrix or cartoon to the MI battalion. Close coordination between the MI battalion S3 and the IEWSO is critical at this point.

When the MI battalion synchronization matrix is completed, the S3 should brief it to the executive officer for quality control and then to the battalion commander. When the OPORD is briefed to company commanders, the S3 briefs the maneuver portion off the synchronization matrix and a map. The S3 attaches a copy of the synchronization matrix to each OPORD for dissemination.

The MI battalion synchronization matrix is not a living document any more than any other synchronization matrix is. For example, no OPORD plan survives enemy contact totally intact. However, branch plans can be added either during wargaming or as the battlefield situation develops. Rather than simply reacting to changing situations, this allows the MI battalion TOC to be proactive, using its preplanned synchronization matrix as a frame of reference. Some battlefield communications make it possible to fax synchronization matrix changes to the MI company commander (albeit via brigade IEWSOs, division support command, or G2 operations in most cases).

- ☐ Bring to the field 8"x11" blank format versions to work off of and, in the event of reproduction limitations, to make copies on for dissemination.
- ☐ Produce an oversized, laminated, erasable version for briefings.
- ☐ Provide a copy of the MI battalion synchronization matrix to division electronic warfare and IEWSOs for coordination.

The 125th MI battalion successfully used the synchronization matrix to plan asset movement around the battlefield. The MI battalion battle staff (S2, S3, IEWSO, and battalion signal officer) worked together to complete the matrix. This resulted in a truly synchronized MI operation in

In Conclusion

The MI battalion synchronization matrix is a tool the commander will not recognize from current field manuals. However, staff officers should use the doctrine in field manuals as a baseline. Even though MI field commanders may disagree as to the format or need for an MI battalion synchronization matrix, maneuver units have successfully tried and tested this tool throughout the Army. Maybe we in the tactical intelligence community should take the hint.

Captain Timothy J. Moynihan is the MI liaison officer (IEWSO), 2d Infantry Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (LI). His previous assignments include platoon leader and executive officer, D Company, 109th MI Battalion; S2, 1-44 Air Defense Artillery Battalion, 9th Infantry Division (Mtz); and ASPS chief, 199th Infantry Brigade (Mtz). He is a graduate of the "new" MIOAC and the Ranger School, and is a 1987 Providence College Distinguished Military Graduate.

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January-March 1993



Threats to the New World Order

by Alan R. Goldman, Ph.D., and Eric Vardac

It is not surprising that in the absence of the Soviet threat or a "hot" war there are uncertainties over priorities, and an unclear focus among MI analysts as to the direction of their threat analysis. This is disturbing and potentially dangerous because there are real military threats to the emerging new world order.

This article presents the framework for our analysis of future conflicts likely to involve U.S. vital interests. We use an analytical approach we developed at the Army Intelligence and Threat Center. We also include a forecast of where future conflicts are likely to occur, and why. Forewarned is forearmed.

Some threats are loud and clear while others evoke dim echoes from the past. Anyone who follows the news about the Balkans must hear at least the faint echoes of World War I; and anyone who reads about potential North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons must hear the clearer reverberations from the Korean and Gulf wars.

The threat of a Soviet nuclear and conventional attack on NATO has receded, and for that we are thankful. Deterrence and collective security worked in Europe. Now what? What does the future hold? Answers to these questions will come from MI analysts who can identify and analyze threats and their implications in a sound and structured way. Findings here provide a start point for the analysis and projection of foreign threats and military doctrine and the objectives of nontraditional regions and countries.

An Appreciation of History

History does not repeat itself, but sometimes it does a darn good imitation. There are primordial forces emerging from the breakup of the post-World War II order that resemble the causes of instability and conflict that followed the post-World War I collapse of the defeated powers. Although history does not repeat itself—the world has changed dramatically from 1914 or even 1989—the traditional causes of war are reasserting themselves. Failure to understand these forces increases the chances we will repeat mistakes, but this time in a far more lethal world.

In the last paragraph of his book *The Origins of World War I 1871-1914*, Joachim Remak wrote:

No power had any ever-all conscious design for war in 1914. Nowhere, even in the summer of 1914, was a calculated, advance decision made for global war. Rather the powers as a result of Sarajevo, became involved in a series of moves and countermoves—all of them, on the face of it logical, reasonable, or at least defensible—that stage by stage, step by step, imperceptibly at times, and hardly with any true vision of the consequences, placed them in a position from which there was no way back to the negotiating table.¹

Pressure is already building to deploy U.S. combat forces into the Balkans to prevent further Serbian aggression. (In the new world order, CNN has the potential to force official responses in peace and war.) Unless we examine the implications of such a move, might we not—even from the purest humanitarian motives—find ourselves step by step, imperceptibly taking ourselves, and our friends, into a political and military mine field?

The Emerging New World Order


The nation-state system is under increasingly intense pressures. World population will double by the middle of the next century, mainly in developing countries that lack the economic base and political institutions to mediate demands and conflicts. At the same time, expectations are rising, and state power over international decision making is being undermined because of the—

- ☐ Rise of global markets.
- ☐ Explosion of technology and information.
- ☐ Exponential increase in international public and private institutions.

The speed and diversity of change is unsettling at global, national, group, and personal levels. As traditional agricultural societies industrialize and adopt new technologies, they displace vested interests and elites. More advanced societies are similarly threatened by the onset of post-industrial knowledge-based economies, and the ease by which labor-intensive industries can move off shore.

Paradoxically, the effect of these changes is to encourage transnational and supranational networks that integrate advanced societies into a complex web of interdependencies; but at the same time, stimulate subnational ethnic, religious, and

tribal activities, especially among people threatened by a loss of status and national identity or encouraged by changes in status. For example, the breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia has unleashed ancient ethnic fears and rivalries, while the uneven progress toward West European unity demonstrates the supranational impetus. The figure below shows the dynamics of this situation.



Clear are the economic trends driving global interdependencies, especially among the core group of advanced states—United States, the European Economic Community (EEC), and Japan. Trade as a percentage of world product has increased dramatically since 1960 accounting for \$3 trillion out of a \$22 trillion global GNP in 1990. Foreign direct investment has grown even faster, outpacing world trade by a factor of three since 1975. There are now about 5,000 transnational organizations like the World Bank and Exxon—double the number since 1945.

There are other economic forces driving nations apart:

- The gap in per capita income between the core group of advanced states and the less developed periphery is widening from a 10:1 ratio in 1950 to 15:1 by 1990.

- The core states have 10 percent of world population and 60 percent of its wealth—and everyone knows it. For in the Third World since 1965, the number of books available has doubled, and radio and television ownership has increased 450 percent and 700 percent respectively. Enrollment in public and primary schools has doubled since 1950.

Military trends also point in two directions. On one hand, the cost of and destructive capacity of modern armaments are driving industrial countries and companies toward cooperation. Since 1950, the average cost of weapons has risen 200 fold, while the cost of goods and services has risen only 7 times. Today, a tank costs 88 times what it did in World War II, a submarine 300 times, and a fighter aircraft 2,000 times. In response, arms manufacturing becomes multinational to gain economic and productivity advantages. Already, 40 percent of advanced electronics in certain U.S. weapons are of Japanese origin. The recent takeover bid by Thompson-CSF of France to acquire LTV demonstrates this trend.

Military integration between nation-states is also moving beyond traditional alliance structures such as NATO. France and Germany are building a common army, and NATO organizes multinational corps. War has grown more costly as surprise attack and easy victory become more difficult. In 1957 the Soviets launched Sputnik; by 1995 it is estimated that 10 countries and some corporations will have real-time space-based reconnaissance assets.

Finally, there is the human cost of war. Current world inventories of nuclear weapons yield are equal to 1,200,000 times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb.

The chance of war is increasing among the less stable, peripheral states, as new countries and national armies are created. Military spending in the less developed world has risen five fold since 1960, while per capita GNP has only doubled. In 1960, no developing country produced tanks, APCs, submarines, or missiles. Now, at least 7 can build tanks, 11 APCs, 7 submarines, and 5 surface-to-surface missiles. Eighteen less developed countries have deployed some type of ballistic missiles. And mankind faces the grim prospect of at least 17 countries with nuclear weapons before the 21st century.

The bottom line is that despite economic and technological competition, the core of advanced states is becoming more integrated and interdependent. But the lack of a clearly defined threat and the difficulty in dealing with socially and politi-

cally derived instability hinders unity of action among NATO allies and Japan. Meanwhile, the less developed world lags further behind economically, remains fragmented and frustrated by its problems, and becomes inexorably more lethal. The world is too small and the perils too great to fail in our understanding of the linkages and interlocking problems among the haves and have nots. Intelligence analysis of these linkages and an appreciation of the causes of war are the antidote to being drawn into war.

Change and the Causes of War

The struggle for wealth and power defines international security affairs. The uneven growth of power among competitors leads to a redistribution of power and a redefinition of interests as the actor enjoying ascendancy becomes more aggressive in asserting his prerogatives; while his opponent, in relative decline, becomes fearful of his own ability to defend his interests. An environment for conflict grows out of such power shifts which produce a perceived unbalance among adversaries with conflicting vital interests. Typically, the response to this is an arms race fueled by a sense of vulnerability.

In *The Causes of Wars*, Michael Howard wrote: (Nations war) to maintain their power, and to do so while it is still possible, before..., they had to accept a subordinate position within an international system dominated by their adversaries.²

In *The Cause of War*, Geoffrey Blainey wrote: Indeed it is the problems of accurately measuring the relative power of nations which goes far to explain why wars occur. War is a dispute about the measurement of power.³

History abounds with examples supporting this statement: 1870 France, 1914 Germany, 1939 Great Britain, 1950 China, 1967 Israel, 1971 Pakistan, 1980 and 1990 Iraq, and 1991 Serbia and Armenia. In all cases, nations felt vulnerable because of a perceived uncertainty or weakening of their power position against a deadly adversary.

MI analysts can track and measure trends in various elements of power—economic, demographic, military, and psychological. They can detect emerging power shifts among or between adversaries, such as—

- ☐ North and South Korea.
- ☐ Serbia and Croatia.
- ☐ Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
- ☐ Ukraine and Russia.
- ☐ Japan and China.

Analysts must apprise policy makers of unfolding military threats and their causes and consequences. The task is difficult and controversial

because some elements of power are qualitative, such as ideas, national will, and ethnic and religious cohesion. Fortunately, there are academic and intelligence tools to deal with these dimensions of power and interest.

The Setting for Future Conflicts

While the U.S., EEC, and Japan are increasingly interdependent, the less developed states remain fragmented, increasingly well armed, and subject to severely destabilizing domestic and foreign pressures. Hence, the focus of foreign intelligence should shift to the periphery, and to an analysis of the linkages between the periphery and the core. The search for future conflict is further narrowed by examining—

- ☐ Sources of severe instability.
- ☐ Uneven growth of power resulting in power shifts.
- ☐ Potential clashes of vital interests.


Survival, security, prosperity, prestige, and peace—these are the vital interests over which states will fight. Large and small states fight to safeguard the supreme interests of survival and security, while greater powers with wider responsibilities are more likely to fight for the full range of vital interests.

Who are the great and emerging powers? Trend analysis of economic, demographic, and military developments shows the United States as the single global superpower until 2010. The great powers with significant regional and some global influence are China, Russia, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Brazil, India, and (a unified) Korea. Multinational entities such as the EEC, Western European Union, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the U.N., and selected multinational corporations will wield international influence. However, the decision to wage interstate war will remain with leaders of each nation-state.

For the interdependent, satisfied core of advanced states, the risks war poses to the international system far exceed potential benefits. These states regulate their competition through negotiations in many forums. An intriguing question is whether China, Korea, Russia, Brazil, and India will join the Western club, and become interdependent with the core of satisfied powers. The rules of admission, however, are strict—candidates must be industrialized democracies. If these countries don't join, they could try to upset the status quo by using violence to diminish the power and status of the core states. The figure on the top of the next page illustrates this.

Fragmentation Mainly Impacts Non-Core Or Periphery States

- While interdependence binds "core" states together



- Economic backwardness, political instability, and military overspending isolate, and keep peripheral states apart

A Forecast of Conflict

The Near East region from Serbia to Iran involves vital U.S. interests and contains all the criteria for conflict:

- ☐ Instability born of population pressures.
- ☐ Weak and corrupt national institutions.
- ☐ Ideological, religious, and ethnic differences.
- ☐ Wide resource and income disparities.
- ☐ Excessive arms and military budgets. See the table below.

Weapons Procurement Budgets, 1992-2002*

•Top Ten LDCs

1. China	\$185 Billion
2. Saudi Arabia	90
3. Egypt**	51
4. Iran	43
5. Taiwan	39
6. South Korea	37
7. Iraq***	36
8. Israel	32
9. India	31
10. Syria	31

*Estimates only

**Plus US Aid

***Pre-Gulf Crisis

The hierarchy of power in this region is difficult to measure. This uncertainty causes nations to form unstable coalitions. Struggles for security and hegemony in the Levant, Persian Gulf, and the

Balkans are ceaseless and will continue to threaten the security of regimes and even nations. At risk for the great powers are prestige, prosperity, and peace.

In Asia, Latin America, and Europe, the trends are mixed. Asia's star is rising because of its economic and demographic dynamism, and its peaceful pursuit of profits. Still, there are destabilizing factors. Wealth and poverty coexist within and among countries. North Korea, a highly armed, impoverished dictatorship, on the decline relative to booming South Korea, is confronting a "do or die" situation akin to East Germany. In the longer term, should any power or coalition gain hegemony in Asia, it will then become a candidate for world superpower status.

Economic trends are improving in Latin America, but social inequities and disenfranchisement of populations fuel armed insurgencies. Profits from the illicit drug trade put weapons in the hands of criminals and insurgents alike. In Europe, there are the haves in the West and the have nots in the East. Yet there are unbreakable linkages between them which can upset European equilibrium and set the region down the road to war. There are also tensions between Europe and Africa that create conditions for conflict.

Where will conflicts occur that can threaten U.S. and allied vital interests? See the map on the next page. Why will they occur? Here are some of the answers:

- ☐ **North Korea (with possible support from China) vs. South Korea and allies:** incipient instability in the North, a power shift to the South, and regime survival.
- ☐ **Andean ridge countries vs. narco-insurgents:** national instability, uncertain power position of governments, and regime and ethnic survival.
- ☐ **Kurds-Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan-Iran-Iraq:** general instability, Kurd and Armenian fear of genocide by Turkey and other rising Moslems, and prestige of Iran vs. Turkey.
- ☐ **Serbia-South Slavs-Greece possibly vs. North Slavs-Moslems including possibly Turkey:** high instability in the Balkans, power shift to Catholics and Moslems, Serbian survival, and Greek security.
- ☐ **Iran-Saudi Arabia-Iraq:** instability of Iran and Iraq; disparate measures of power—Saudi money, Iran population, and Iraqi arms; and Iraq and Saudi regime survival and prosperity.
- ☐ **Israel vs. Arab Coalition:** Israeli and Arab domestic instability, power shift away from Is-

rael if Arabs coalesce, Israeli survival, and Arab prestige.

Each of these potential conflicts affects the prestige, prosperity, and peace of the core states. In all instances, the line between peace and war is blurred by continuing violence. In all instances, these conflicts could spread to the great powers and engage them in larger wars involving nuclear weapons. For example:

- ☐ Allies vs. Arabs in North Africa, Middle East, or Persian Gulf.
- ☐ Russia vs. Ukraine (and allies) or Moslem Republics.
- ☐ India vs. Pakistan.
- ☐ China vs. India.
- ☐ Japan vs. Korea.
- ☐ Japan (possibly allied with Russia or Siberia) vs. China (possibly allied with Korea).

In all of this, the MI analyst has a vital role that begins with understanding the whys and wherefores of war. The analyst must assess linkages between these conflicts and vital U.S. and allied interests. The analyst must study and analyze foreign national objectives, military plans and budgets, and the antagonists' warfighting capabilities. The mission is to safeguard American security by preparing our Armed Forces to deter or

to fight future wars in a new world order.


Our MI analysts must deliver clear, accurate, and timely intelligence forecasts and projections to defense policy planners and decision makers. Only then will the United States be ahead in planning, manning, training, and equipping our Armed Force either to maintain the peace or to fight wars. The intellectual challenge of grasping the threat in the new world order is exciting and analytically demanding, and vital for the preservation of our national security.

Endnotes

1. Joachim Remak, *The Origins of World War II, 1871-1914* (Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press, 1967), 149-150.
2. Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 16.
3. Geoffrey Blainey, *The Cause of War* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1973) 114.

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PROPONENT NOTES



Officer Notes

The MI Must Fill project is nearly complete for the FY 94 Officer Distribution Plan (ODP). For the past 2 years, the project has been a huge success in getting officers in the right grades to critical positions in major commands and posts. For total success, though, senior MI officers need to work with local personnel offices to make sure officers are assigned to appropriate Must Fill positions. We have a long-term field grade problem on our hands, with severe shortages at the rank of major. We anticipate even more field grade inventory shortages, and we may not be able to meet our field grade ODP goals for FY 93 and beyond.

We continue to process the new Skill Identifier F4 for the Reserve Component (RC) 12K/N GUARDRAIL Common Sensor Pilot. We have finished coordinating with the Aviation Center and have forwarded the packet to PERSCOM for Army Staff and MACOM approval. We expect this will make the October 1993 update to **AR 611-101, Personnel Selection and Classification, Commissioned Officer Classification System**, and **AR 611-112, Personnel Selection and Classification, Manual of Warrant Officer Military Occupational Specialties**.

Area of Concentration 35C is being reviewed to determine its future roles, functions, and professional development. Along with INSCOM and the DCSINT staff, we are examining a concept to establish a tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP)/Space Oriented Officer. This would give officers an opportunity to have an expanded role in space-based intelligence collection systems.

A new regulation, **AR 600-13, Army Policy for Assignment of Female Soldiers**, spells out the criteria for determining Direct Combat Probability Coding—whether or not a position should be closed to females. The new guidelines also give the Proponent greater flexibility in determining which positions should be coded closed.

Enlisted Notes

Exciting things are happening in the enlisted arena. The next issue features an article in "Train-

ing Notes" about the new 96U UAV Operator, and later in this column we discuss Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) changes for soldiers involved in TENCAP.

OCMI has approved a USAISD-PERSCOM initiative to allow MOS 33Y10 soldiers to transition to MOS 33R10. This action allows 33Y10's to apply for a transition course instead of having to attend the longer, more formal 33R course. Don't miss your chance for an interesting job with excellent career potential.

The recommended action to eliminate ASI T4 (TENCAP Operations) and to establish three separate ASIs was approved and will be published in the April 1993 update to **AR 611-201, Enlisted Career Management Fields (CMFs) and Military Occupational Specialties**. The change affects CMF 33, Electronic Warfare/Intercept Systems Maintenance; CMF 96, Military Intelligence; and CMF 98, Signals Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations.

The change allows field commanders to requisition soldiers for specific TENCAP systems. ASI T4 was created to identify soldiers trained on two specific TENCAP systems. However, new systems are being fielded that require totally different training, so we can no longer properly requisition or assign using a single ASI. The new ASIs are described below:

ASI 1T: IPDS/TRAC/IES/NIS TENCAP Operations—USAIC&FH

- ☐ Description of positions: identifies positions requiring training and experience to operate IPDS/TRAC/IES/NIS TENCAP systems.
- ☐ Qualifications: must have completed one of the following courses:
 - Imagery Processing and Dissemination System (IPDS) Course.
 - Tactical Radar Correlator (TRAC) Course.
 - Imagery Exploitation System (IES) Course.
 - National Input Segment (NIS) Course.

(Note: system contractors teach all courses.)

- ☐ Restrictions: for use only with MOSs 33T, 33R, 33V, and 96D. Only OCMI can award this skill identifier. OCMI must approve the

use of this skill identifier in authorization documents.

ASI 2T: ETUT/TUT/THMT TENCAP Operations—USAIC&FH

- ☐ Description of positions: identifies positions requiring training and experience to operate ETUT/TUT/THMT TENCAP systems.
- ☐ Qualifications: must have completed the Collection Management/TENCAP System Specific Module, USAIC&FH; and the Enhanced Tactical User Terminal Course (ETUT), 3A-S13E/233-ASI-2T, USAISD.
- ☐ Restrictions: for use only with MOSs 96B, 96D, 98C, 98J. OCMI must approve the use of this skill identifier in authorization documents.

ASI 3T: EPDS TENCAP Operations—USAIC&FH

- ☐ Description of positions: identifies positions requiring training and experience to operate Electronic Processing and Dissemination System (EPDS) TENCAP systems.
- ☐ Qualifications: must have completed the EPDS Operator Course, 3B-S19/233-ASI 3T, USAISD.
- ☐ Restrictions: for use only with MOS 98J. OCMI must approve the use of this skill identifier in authorization documents.

Soldiers now holding ASI T4 will be awarded one of the above ASIs based on the system they are trained on. Forward your reclassification request through OCMI to PERSCOM.

In the October-December issue, we provided an update on the effort to consolidate MOSs 98D, 98H, and 98K. The preliminary results of the field study are now available. The current effort is directed toward the possible consolidation of 98 CMF specialties into four MOSs—three collector and one analyst. MOSs 98H, 98J, 98G, and 98C, along with 98Z, will remain. Soldiers in MOSs 98D and 98K will be merged into one of the collector specialties. Remember, this is still ONLY a proposal and is not yet finalized. We will continue to keep you informed of this and all other actions affecting the MI Corps.

ASIs are constantly changing based on changes made to associated MOSs. Here are the latest ASI changes affecting MI MOSs.

Deleted:

- ☐ 9K—Defense Against Methods of Entry (DAME) Technician.
- ☐ D5—Area Intelligence Operations.
- ☐ K1—Mobile Army Ground Imagery Interpretation Center (MAGIIC) Operations and Maintenance.
- ☐ T4—TENCAP Operations.
- ☐ W1—Aerial Photoactive Sensor Repairer.

Added:

- ☐ S7—Foreign Counterintelligence (97B).
- ☐ 1A—Joint STARS E-8A Systems Operator (96H).
- ☐ 1B—OV-1D Systems Operator (96H).
- ☐ 1E—UAV Module Mission Payload Operator (96H).
- ☐ 1T—IPDS/TRAC/NIS TENCAP Operations (33R/33T/96D).
- ☐ 2L—Aerial Sensor Repair (33R).
- ☐ 2T—ETUT/TUT/THMT TENCAP Operations (96B/96D/98C/98J).
- ☐ 3T—EPDS TENCAP Operations (98J).

Language Notes

We strongly encourage our 98G and 97E linguists in overstrength languages to make career choices as soon as possible. Current 98G and 97E language overages remain a problem, but help is on the way. The 98G German, Czech, and Polish linguist surpluses are being remedied, with Czech still showing an overstrength in the next 6 months. By the end of FY 93, the 98G (Country Code CX) strength will still exceed authorizations by approximately 70 personnel. Soldiers in this category need to act by submitting DA Form 4187 through their chain of command to PERSCOM requesting one of the following options:

- ☐ Request 97B counterintelligence agent.
- ☐ Request language retraining into a shortage language requirement within MOSs 98C/98G/97E/97B.
- ☐ Request any MI shortage MOS.

Language shortages for 98G through October 1993 are Syrian (AP), Arab Gulf (DG), and Spanish (LA). Shortages for 97E through October 1993 are DG and LA.

The world situation is changing, and future language requirements will also change. We will need trained linguists in languages such as Ukrainian, Belorussian, Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani. Since the break up of the Soviet Union, these languages are spoken in the newly independent nations of the Confederation of Independent States. No doubt, each of those countries will maintain a military and the language spoken will no longer be Russian.

We recommend that all linguists maintain proficiency in their languages and keep up to date on the world situation. MI linguists must be prepared to learn new languages and to learn about the cultures of the countries in which these languages are spoken. Learning the geography and familiarizing themselves with the languages of the neighboring countries and the historical alian-

ces and hostilities among and between those countries will also aid Army linguists.

MI language soldiers interested and willing to stay in the Army as linguists can also fill shortages as airborne parachutists. At Fort Bragg alone, there are opportunities for 98G, 97B, and 97E. They are by MOS: 98G—Syrian, Spanish, and Arabic Egyptian; 97B—Arabic Egyptian, Syrian, French, and Spanish; and 97E—Syrian, Arabic Egyptian, and Spanish.

For those linguists and MI soldiers who find they have no other option, there are opportunities in CMF 18 (Special Forces) and CMF 37 (Psychological Operations). Soldiers willing to be retrained into

a low-density language in either CMF 18 or 37 should submit a written request. As of this publication, the Army needs linguists in Serbo-Croatian, Romanian, Laotian, Cambodian, Vietnamese, Somalian, French-Creole, Linggala, and even a few Czechoslovakian.

These are just a few of the language requirements in the two CMFs outside of MI. Whatever the choice is, make it yours. Don't wait for a choice to be made for you.

We continue to refine the Linguist Life Cycle. This is a comprehensive action plan that outlines what it will take to be a highly skilled, professional linguist into the 21st century.

TOTAL FORCE



MI Relook

The good news continues in this arena for the Reserve Component (RC) MI community. The MI Proponent is on track in documenting an **Expandable** battalion designed to support a National Guard division. Clearly, these RC divisions will not be short-changed. They retain a **ready** and doctrinally correct unit structure that supports all the peacetime training activities including annual training. Also, as Guard divisions are mobilized in wartime, the corresponding MI battalion will also be mobilized and brought to full strength with the appropriate language.

With that situation as background, be aware that the newly created intelligence linguist units come from slots pulled from the RC MI battalion. Organized in modules (teams), these MI linguists will be available for worldwide contingency assignments. Therefore, RC MI-trained linguist soldiers will be mobilized as teams to support the Total Force.

We are excited about this positive use of citizen-soldiers.

MI Life Cycle

We have discussed this topic before and will, undoubtedly, do so again. The MI Life Cycle outlines various paths MI career soldiers can take to achieve their own goals as well as those of the MI Branch. The import of MOS qualified and trained

soldiers into the RC is vital to our success. However, the significance of experience in a particular MI skill is also relevant. School training is not enough. For this reason we are working with RC leadership to develop an MI Life Cycle for RC MI soldiers both within a component such as the Guard and between components such as Guard to Reserve.

All too often we get calls from senior majors or lieutenant colonels asking to become MI qualified. However, a lieutenant colonel with 23 years' experience taking MIOAC with junior captains not only bumps another captain from the slot, but also cuts a qualified MI officer from a troop unit slot. An effective MI Life Cycle will ensure that MI soldiers are firmly on track; and there should be no need to go outside to fill MI slots.

We hear regularly from that hopeful lieutenant colonel, who wants the MI slot, that "there's nobody else out there to take it." But, perhaps, the unit or command simply hasn't tried to find a qualified candidate who happens to be in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) or in the "wrong" component. Yet, for example, when the 629th MI Battalion in Maryland searched for a qualified MI battalion commander, ARPERCEN provided more than 60 candidates in the geographical zip code.

Factoids

During the last 3 years, we at the MI Proponent

graduated 450 lieutenants from MIOBC—about evenly divided between Reserve and Guard. These are fills for MI troop unit requirements. At the same time, we trained 45 captains in the resident MIOAC—mostly Guard troop unit slots. And the Huachuca Reserve Forces Intelligence School trained over 500 officers in the RC MIOAC. Right now in the IRR pool, there are more than 800 MI captains and lieutenants MOS-qualified as 35D's—our basic tactical MI requirement.

Back to Life Cycle

Sorry for belaboring you with these statistics, but the empirical data clearly shows there are qualified MI soldiers available to fill MI troop slots. And more and more are segueing from the Active Component (AC) as we speak. The bottom line is that we need to place qualified MI soldiers in MI slots, and not to continue to retrain.

Some believe this is unfair because RC soldiers cannot be transferred the way AC soldiers can. Also, some will cite the RC lieutenant colonel who is "qualified" in five or six branches. However, we simply don't believe you can be successful as an MI leader if you don't have both school training and upwardly mobile MI assignments. As the AC shrinks, and as the Army relies more on us in the RC, we must be ready MOS qualified and not have to attend school after mobilization.

We in the MI Proponent are convinced that the MI Life Cycle is an idea whose time has come. We have received commitments from the Chief of Army Reserve and the Director of the Army National Guard endorsing this concept—an incredible step in itself. Also, MI Relook has asked that senior M-Day soldiers from the Army Reserve and the Army Guard lead a task force to make MI Life Cycle a reality.

We will have more on this in future issues. But we need a commitment from you, our RC MI leaders, to support this idea and not request training exceptions for non-MI soldiers. The most important thing each RC MI commander and senior staff officer can do is to develop your junior MI officers on your team to succeed you. Work on succession and transition as a priority.

It's true that some geographic areas don't offer MI career opportunities, and to succeed you have to take other branches such as Infantry or Engineer. We understand this: you may need to move between MI and a Combat Arms branch in a particular state. But when a slot for a field grade in MI opens, make sure the MI school-trained officer gets first crack. Not only will clearances be easier to update, but also you will have an MI-smart soldier.

We are prototyping this program in Utah—the home of the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) and two MI linguist battalions. We have trained hundreds of MI soldiers for these MI units. But within Component 2 (Army Guard) in Utah, there are MI slots in Engineer, Artillery, and Special Forces units. For example, there is no reason why a captain who has successfully served in an MI linguist battalion should not move to the S2 slot of the Artillery battalion. As a matter of fact, state Guard officials have been very cooperative in supporting this.

While Utah only encompasses Component 2 (Army Guard), we're running an MI Life Cycle prototype in Pennsylvania with the 28th Division (Army Guard) and the 128th MI Battalion (Army Reserve). This is being done along with our test of the MI RC **Expansible** battalion. This test will be more difficult since soldiers transfer between components. But we think this is doable. We want to identify and remove red tape for the Reserve soldier who sees an upward mobility opportunity in the Guard.

MI Hall of Fame Seeks RC Nominations

There are 125 members of the MI Hall of Fame. Many of them have worked to ensure MI included Total Force soldiers. We should recognize those MI citizen-soldiers who have worked from an RC perspective to enhance the effectiveness of the Army Reserve and Guard in intelligence matters. If you in the MI RC community know of such an individual, please nominate this person for induction. Nominations require a career biography with specific MI achievements. Our Proponency Office is the POC. Please call or write us for further details. Let's get some RC MI M-Dayers in our MI Hall of Fame.

Colonel Joe Mesch and Lieutenant Colonel Dave Miner work Reserve Forces issues at the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. They can be reached at DSN 821-1176/77, CM (602) 533-1176/77; or by mail, ATTN: ATZA-RA. They encourage you to write "Letters to the Editor."

The staff of Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin appreciates your input. Comments concerning any aspect of this publication can be sent to:

**Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence Center
ATZS-TDL-B
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000**

Challenging Careers in the Defense Attache System

Army NCOs, E-5 through E-8, looking for a challenging and rewarding career opportunity in over 80 countries worldwide are being sought for duty in the Defense Attache System (DAS).

The DAS is recruiting highly motivated and qualified NCOs seeking joint service staff assignments within American embassies throughout the world. Selected NCOs are given the opportunity to represent the U.S. Army in diplomatic assignments in Europe, Africa, the Far East, the Middle East, and North, Central, and South America.

According to Sergeant First Class John Currier, enlisted assignments coordinator, "No other Army program provides soldiers with the opportunity to live and work in so many different countries. From Austria to Zimbabwe, from Brazil to Finland, and from Canada to Turkey. These worldwide diplomatic assignments offer a challenge quite like

no other."

NCOs considering attache duty must be clearable for special intelligence, have a GT score of 115 or higher, a clerical score of 120 or higher, and a typing score of 40 WPM or higher. Soldiers must also test 100 or higher on the defense language aptitude battery (DLAB) or be a skilled linguist. Computer (word processing) skills are helpful as well. All family members must be U.S. citizens and meet the medical standards for the country of assignment.

Prerequisites, application procedures, and countries available within the program can be found in AR 611-60, Assignment of Army Attache Duty. For additional information, contact Sergeant First Class Currier at DSN 923-2134/7361, ext 2633 or comm (410) 677-2134/7361, ext 2633. FAX: DSN 923-5352 or comm (410) 677-5352.

MOS 96U, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator, CMF 96

By Sergeant First Class Noel Lopez-Alvarez

Last May, the Office of the Chief of Staff for Personnel approved the establishment of MOS 96U, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator, CMF 96. The UAV operator will be responsible for supervising or operating the UAV. The UAV operator's duties include mission planning, minor air frame repair, launching, remotely piloting, and recovering the aerial vehicle.

MOS 96U provides excellent career progression (from private to sergeant major) in this career field. We strongly encourage soldiers in overstrength MOSs and who are eligible for reclassification, and soldiers in MOSs scheduled to be reduced or eliminated from the Army to take advantage of this opportunity and apply for this new MOS.

UAV operators must have the following qualifications:

- ☐ Have a physical profile of 222221.
- ☐ Possess normal color vision.
- ☐ Have a minimum score of 105 in aptitude area SC.
- ☐ Have a Secret clearance.
- ☐ Be a U.S. citizen.
- ☐ Meet career management and development criteria listed in **AR 600-200, Enlisted Personnel Management System, AR 614-200, Selection of Enlisted Soldiers for Training and Assignment**, and

DA Pam 351-4, Army Formal Schools Catalog.

- ☐ Be a high school graduate or have a GED equivalent.
- ☐ Have completed mandatory formal training.
- ☐ Have never been in the U.S. Peace Corps, except as specified in **AR 614-200**.
- ☐ Have no information in Provost Marshal, intelligence, Military Personnel Records Jacket, or medical records that would prevent the granting of a security clearance under the provisions of **AR 604-5**.
- ☐ Have no court martial conviction.
- ☐ Have no civil court conviction for any offense other than minor traffic violations.

Due to the nature of training and assignments, temporary restrictions may be placed on foreign travel both during and after the term of service.

Institutional/Resident Training for the UAV operator is scheduled to start during fourth quarter FY 94. Applications should be submitted 6 months before training begins, through your chain of command, to Commander, PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC-EPL-M, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331-0453.

SFC Lopez-Alvarez is the Proponent NCO for Career Management Field 96 for OCMI.

POLITICAL SCIENCE TEACHERS NEEDED

The United States Military Academy, Department of Social Sciences, is looking for company grade ROTC or OCS officers interested in teaching political science or economics. If you are from basic year groups 1986-1990, and are interested in civilian graduate study followed by a teaching assignment at West Point, please contact us. We are currently considering applications of officers who might be available to start graduate study in the summer of 1994 or later. For more information, write: Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, ATTN: Personnel Officer, West Point, NY 10996.

Glossary for the IBOC article appearing on pages 6 through 15

AEB	aerial exploitation battalion	ITAC	intelligence threat and analysis center
ARL	airborne reconnaissance low	JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
ASP	all-source production	L	light
ATARS	Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System	LMRDFS	lightweight manpack radio direction finding system
avn	aviation	Inch	launch
bde	brigade	maint	maintenance
blk	block	MC	maneuver control
bn	battalion	MCS	maneuver control system
C³	command, control, and communications	MDCI	multidiscipline counterintelligence
cdr	commander	METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
CGSC	Command and General Staff College	mnfr	monitoring
CM	collection management	nati	national
cmd	command	NMJIC	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
co	company	NMIST	National MI Support Team
COMINT	communications intelligence	NSA	National Security Agency
comms	communications	NSOC	National SIGINT Operations Center
CONUS	Continental United States	ops	operations
CTT-H	Commander's Tactical Terminal-Hybrid	RC	Reserve Component
DCSINT	Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence	rcvry	recovery
DDN	Defense Data Network	REMBASS	Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System
DF	direction finding	S&TI	scientific and technical intelligence
div	division	sec	section
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency	SOF	Special Operations Forces
DOCEX	document exploitation	spt	support
DOD	Department of Defense	svc	service
DSNET	defense security network	TAREX	target exploitation
ETUT	enhanced tactical users terminal	TCAC	technical control and analysis center
FS	fire support	TCAE	technical control and analysis element
H	heavy	TEB	tactical exploitation battalion
HHOC	Headquarters, Headquarters and Operations Company	tech	technical
HQ	headquarters	tms	teams
IES	imagery exploitation system	TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
IMINT	imagery intelligence	TRAP	tactical receive equipment and related application
INSCOM	Intelligence and Security Command	U&S	unified and specified
Intel	intelligence	veh	vehicle
Intg	interrogation		
IPF	integrated processing facility		

VANTAGE POINT

(Continued from page 2)

"putting a stick in the enemy's eyes." As warfare becomes more lethal, force protection becomes an imperative that demands proactive intelligence and targeting emphasis.

System of Systems and Echelonment. We have always talked about a system of intelligence systems, because no echelon has ever had all of the organic assets it needs to fully satisfy its commander's intelligence and targeting requirements. As a consequence, each echelon has had to rely on other echelons to help provide requisite support. Having said that, up to now we have always had significant gaps between echelons, especially between corps and echelons above corps (EAC), which adversely affected our ability to execute in a system of systems mode. These gaps stood to be worsened by the increased role of Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) in each theater, unless we could bridge them effectively. The new concept does exactly that with two key organizations: the Corps MI Support Element (CMISE) and the Joint MI Support Element (JMISE), which will be provided from the EAC MI brigade in each theater to reinforce the corps and JIC, respectively. The combination of a CMISE, EAC MI brigade, and JMISE provides a continuous "smart" bridge from the corps to the JIC and beyond to national and departmental agencies, ensuring for the first time a truly seamless system of intelligence systems focused on the warfighters.

The system of systems must be highly flexible to support force projection operations. During the predeployment and initial entry phases of the operation, the preponderance of intelligence support must be provided in a "push" mode from EAC intelligence organizations, including national, departmental (INSCOM's Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, for example), and joint agencies. The entire effort during this phase and all subsequent phases must be focused downward to provide tailored support to deploying and deployed echelons in response to their commanders' PIR. This support should include requisite data regarding the theater of operations and points of entry into the theater (strategic, operational, and tactical level IPB), as well as pertinent data regarding threat forces, their organizations, capabilities, and disposition.

Immediately before deployment, deploying forces must be "topped off" with the latest intelligence on

the area of operation and enemy dispositions. If significant changes occur in the threat or at points of entry, they must be transmitted to deploying forces en route, via satellite communications to hatch-mounted antennas on their aircraft. Finally, as units debark at their point of entry, they must receive any additional intelligence updates. Throughout this process, deploying and deployed units must be able to "pull" intelligence through specific queries to higher echelon intelligence staffs and organizations and have direct access to relevant data bases to answer their commanders' time-sensitive requirements.

CONUS and other secure bases must continue to support deployed units, until the collection, production, and dissemination infrastructure in theater is sufficiently mature to take over portions of the support. As systems such as Joint STARS, Rivet Joint, and the U2-R begin operating in theater, Army units equipped with the Joint STARS Ground Station Module (GSM) or the Common Ground Station (CGS) will be able to immediately downlink data in NRT from them that is tailored to each unit's area of responsibility.

Until that time, processors which provide rapid receipt of intelligence from national systems (such as the Imagery and Electronics Processing and Dissemination Systems [IPDS and EPDS]) and high capacity, long haul communications systems (such as TROJAN SPIRIT and the SUCCESS radio) will be critical. These processors can provide a continuous flow of intelligence, including annotated imagery products, to satisfy many warfighting requirements.

As the flow of forces and intelligence capabilities continues into the theater, organic corps and division collection systems can begin to operate, assuming operations security permits. Corps systems, such as GUARDRAIL Common Sensor and the UAV-Short Range, will not only collect to significant depths, but will also provide targeting accuracies and downlink in NRT to multiple command and control and fire support nodes down to maneuver brigade.

At this point, tactical commanders should see correlated intelligence and targets provided by multiple sensors in NRT to their CGSs. This will be augmented by data from national systems received in NRT at corps, and other tailored data pushed from national, departmental, and joint agencies via TROJAN SPIRIT to corps and joint task forces. The corps, in turn, must pass tailored, all-source products to subordinate echelons via TROJAN SPIRIT and through the Army Common User System (Mobile Subscriber Equipment) when it be-

comes operational in theater. Included in these push packages must be annotated imagery products passed via secondary imagery dissemination to the Tactical High Mobility Terminal or its downsized follow-on, the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT), in each division.

The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) will be used to fuse intelligence from all sources at EAC, corps, and division. Each echelon will concentrate on providing its commanders with tailored, graphic intelligence products and targets, focused on their commander's specific intelligence and targeting priorities, when they need them, synchronized with their concepts of operations. Concurrently, they must support subordinate echelons in providing similarly synchronized intelligence and targets to meet their commander's requirements.

A key point in this discussion is that our new concept eliminates the notion of periodic intelligence summaries and focuses instead on providing dynamic intelligence and targets, synchronized with commanders' operational requirements. This is a significant change: instead of being solely requirements driven or in the worst case, time focused as in producing an intelligence summary every x hours, we must now be requirements and product oriented. For example, we must provide the commander **what** he needs, when he needs it, synchronized with his concept of operations. This is the only way we can support commanders properly on the dynamic, modern battlefield of the future, and it will take extraordinary efforts on all our parts, at every echelon, to deliver. This means that the entire intelligence cycle at each echelon must be focused on providing synchronized intelligence and targets not only to support commanders at that echelon, but also to help subordinate echelons provide similar, synchronized support to their commanders.

Clearly, we must have responsive communications and automation support at each echelon to enable us to execute our new concept and to provide commanders at each echelon the synchronized intelligence support they require. Fortunately, both the communications and the automation to do this are funded to be fielded in the next 4 years. We have developed a communications and automation concept and architecture to support our new operational concept, and all the pieces of that architecture are coming together. Key elements include:

1. Direct broadcast dissemination in NRT from multiple sensors: Joint STARS, UAV-Short and Close Range, GUARDRAIL Common Sensor, U2-R, Rivet Joint, plus the national TRE/TRAP broadcast

at a minimum will downlink in NRT to the CGS.

2. High capacity, long-haul communications: both TROJAN SPIRIT and the SUCCESS radio are fielded now, and an additional 19 SPIRITs along with 6 MITTs will be fielded in the next 2 years. We also will have direct links with the Army Common User and Defense Communications systems to extend and complement intelligence connectivity.

3. ASAS Block I will be fielded to 11 units in CY 93 and 94; and Block II will evolve rapidly from Block I by rapid prototyping through a joint prototyping effort between the PM ASAS and the Intelligence Center, fully sanctioned by the Program Executive Officer for Command and Control Systems (PEOCCS).

4. The CGS will also be developed through rapid prototyping led by the IEW Technology Assessment Center (IEWTAC) at Fort Huachuca. The IEWTAC is a collaborative effort involving CECOM, Army Research Laboratories, INSCOM, PEOIEW, PEOCCS, and the Intelligence Center to leverage technology and industry Independent Research and Development (IR&D) to achieve enhanced capabilities. Our intent is to build a prototype CGS within 12 months using the Joint STARS GSM as a base. The CGS will give us excellent connectivity to multiple echelons down to maneuver brigade level. Our intent is to work closely with the Armor, Infantry, and Signal Centers to extend this connectivity to the battalion task force commander as soon as possible.

5. A final feature of our concept is command and control and intelligence on the move. We are working with the Army Space Program Office to develop antennas that will enable us to downlink multiple sensors on the move and also receive data files which will generate computer-graphic depictions of the situation. We have already demonstrated the ability to hit a moving, HMMWV-mounted GSM with satellite transmitted Joint STARS data. Our goal is to be able to provide similar data and computer generated graphics of situations and targeting displays to commanders on the move in their command vehicles, regardless of type. We are confident we can develop and demonstrate this capability through the IEWTAC in less than 2 years.

I hope the power and flexibility of our new concept are apparent after reading this brief description and Major Rob Hallagan's article. It will optimize the employment of our new systems and ensure we focus the capabilities of our entire system of systems on supporting warfighting commanders—the *raison d'être* of our MI Corps.

Apart from the progress we are making with our

new concept, we are also making equally significant progress on several other fronts. Funding support is continuing to field all 14 of our flagship systems in the next 4 years, and testing of various systems to date continues on track with only minor slips. We have briefed our new concept-based organizational designs to senior commanders at each echelon in Europe and the Pacific, and all have been supportive. By the time this issue of MIPB goes to press, we should have completed briefing all senior leaders, including theater CINCs, and have received Army Chief of Staff approval to

proceed with their implementation.

A final note in terms of our dreams coming true as an MI Corps. We have taken occupancy of the first three barracks and first two applied instruction buildings newly constructed at the Intelligence Center to accommodate the move of the Intelligence School Devens to join us at Fort Huachuca. The first class, previously taught at Fort Devens, started at Fort Huachuca February 8, 1993, marking the realization of another dream. The ceremony that commemorated this great occasion will be discussed in our next issue.

VANTAGE POINT

(Continued from page 3)

fied soldier first; however, if that soldier is no longer qualified or cannot attend, the command may substitute another qualified soldier. **In that case, the substitute must be the most qualified soldier from the candidate list even if that soldier was manually added to the list.** The BARS Report contains the list of soldiers not eligible to attend BNCOC and the reason. If a soldier has overcome the reason (such as, not a PLDC graduate) he or she should be considered a candidate.

a. For TDY and return soldiers, the command must substitute or cancel the reservation.

b. For TDY en route soldiers, the career branch is responsible, since the reservation is made in conjunction with an assignment. If the soldier departs the installation prior to notification or the assignment is cancelled, the NCOES Branch lets the command substitute a "TDY and return soldier" for a "TDY en route soldier", **provided the command coordinates with the career branch.** In other words, if the career branch doesn't use the class seat, the command may. If career branches do not use or cancel it, they are charged with a no-show.

Cancellations. It is better to have cancellations than no-shows. If the command cannot find a substitute, they should cancel as soon as possible so the class seat can be used within the MACOM. When a reservation is cancelled within 45 days of the class start date, it is very difficult to fill.

Reservations, Waits, and Walk-Ins

All soldiers scheduled by the BARS Report are given reservations. ATRRS will allow reservations only to the number of quotas for a particular class. "Overbooking" will appear as "waits" in ATRRS. Since the NCOES Section normally overbooks classes, reservations and waits have the same priority.

NCOES Code Updating Procedure

The automated process to update NCOES codes on the Personnel Data Base and Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) involves—

- ☐ Extracting the graduate data from ATRRS on a weekly basis.
- ☐ Reformatting the data.
- ☐ Entering it into the Personnel Data Base which downloads to SIDPERS.

The school must send all failure academic reports to the NCOES Section for manual input. If the automated system does not update within 90 days following graduation, the soldier or the Personnel Services Center can send a copy of the academic report (DA Form 1059) to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, ATTN: TAPC-EPT-FN, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400. The academic report will be used as documentation for manual input.

For more information on the BARS Report, write to Sergeant Major Jeffrey Stoddard at the above address or call DSN 221-8424.

I hope this information will help you understand how the BARS Report works. We must ensure the right soldiers are sent to school at the right time.

WRITER OF THE YEAR

MIPB is pleased to announce the 1992 winners of the "Writer of the Year" contest.

Writer of the Year: Mary C. Fitzgerald, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," Oct-Dec 1992.

Runner-up: LTC Wayne M. Hall, "Intelligence Analysis in the 21st Century," Jan-Mar 1992.

Honorable Mention Recipients: LTC William V. Wenger, CA ARNG, and 1LT Fredric W. Young, CA ARNG, "The Los Angeles Riots and Tactical Intelligence," Oct-Dec 1992; and CPT Christopher P. Costa, "Changing Gears: Special Operations Intelligence Support to Operation Provide Comfort," Oct-Dec 1992.

Congratulations to the winners! "Thank you" to all of our authors. It is your contribution that makes MIPB the forum for MI professionals.

PROFESSIONAL READING

Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA by G.J.A. O'Toole (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991), 591 pages, \$35.00.

This is a comprehensive, fascinating account of intelligence in American history. G.J.A. O'Toole traces the development of American intelligence from the Revolutionary War to the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He successfully places intelligence operations into their historical context, describing both why they happened and what effect they had on subsequent events. By showing that secret operations are a major subplot of the American experience, O'Toole effectively dispels the notion that intelligence and covert operations are somehow dishonorable and un-American.

Beginning with several superb chapters on George Washington and his effective spy network, O'Toole weaves through American history to recount every important American intelligence and counterintelligence operation. Concentrating on strategic, diplomatic, and MI, he often dips into the tactical realm too. While he describes the intelligence organizations, sources, and methods, his orientation lies with people. Some of these characters are well known—Allan Pinkerton, famous Civil War spymaster, and William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services; some are not—Elizabeth Van Lew, head of a Union spy network in Richmond, and Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock, intelligence chief in the Mexican War. O'Toole tells of their exploits in a crisp and absorbing narrative.

O'Toole's book is more than just a series of exciting spy stories. Besides these tales of derring-do, he examines the growth of the American intel-

ligence profession. He shows how the increasing use of technology and modern techniques forced the gifted amateur to give way to the specialized professional. With the advent of the professional, new specialized organizations also came into being. O'Toole traces the development of these organizations from the Civil War's Bureau of Military Information, to Woodrow Wilson's Inquiry, to World War II's Office of Strategic Services, to the modern CIA. As a result, O'Toole builds the historical framework of our profession.

In addition, he provides balanced assessments of American intelligence successes and failures. O'Toole is a retired intelligence professional himself, so it's not surprising that his overall tone is positive—a pleasant change from the usual intelligence bashing. But O'Toole is quick to point out the failures also. His evaluations are not simply finger-pointing, but judicious critiques of what went wrong. For example, in his outstanding chapter on Pearl Harbor, he argues that "the American intelligence system had developed a capacity to collect information that far exceeded its capacity to process and analyze it." His accounts of Pearl Harbor and other failures effectively offset many of the conspiracy theories.

If the scope of O'Toole's book is remarkable, his research is even more so. He has rummaged deep into hundreds of sources to weave the continuous story of American intelligence; not an easy task since historians have largely overlooked espionage and secret operations. For the modern intelligence professional, O'Toole has provided an excellent starting point for further historical studies.

Comprehensive in its scope, balanced in its assessments, and exciting in its narrative, O'Toole's book is one not to be missed. It is easily the best one-volume account of the

evolution of American intelligence. Intelligence professionals can do no better than reading this marvelous book to gain historical perspective and insight into how their profession has served America for over 200 years.

CPT Michael E. Bigelow
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Intrigue and War in Southwest Asia: The Struggle for Supremacy from Central Asia to Iraq by Miron Rezun (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1991), 169 pages, \$42.95.

This volume focuses on past and present problems in a volatile region. The author examines Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia (including the Central Asian republics) in relation to U.S. and Soviet policies. The author, a Canadian political scientist, is ultra critical of American policy. Nevertheless, his work clearly shows there are no easy solutions to these longstanding regional problems.

The "great game," Rezun refers to, is the policies, intrigues, and games of influence played by earlier colonial powers such as Germany and Britain, and later, post-World War II U.S. and USSR. Rezun correctly points out that now the U.S. can impose its will in the region to whatever extent it wants.

Readers will learn how after World War I Turkey was oppressed by whatever side was the current winner in numerous conflicts waged in the region. The struggle for Afghanistan, currently locked in bitter civil war, was probably programmed by the Soviets decades before they invaded the country. Rezun also contends that Iraq's attempt to become an Arab superpower was aided by the West's fear of Iran in the late 1970's, Persian Gulf oil dominance, and inattentiveness. According to the author, these conditions led to Hussein's grab for Kuwait.

As for Iran, it has now shifted its glance northward toward the former Soviet Central Asian republics, all of which are Muslim. Other states too are trying to curb Shi'ite religious influence by affecting events, economies, and governments.

Published in 1991, the book fails to examine Desert Storm's aftermath, but Rezun's predictions are still valid. The Kurds are once again at the mercy of Iraq. Hussein remains in power. The U.S. and the West have secured their oil supply and have lost interest in Iraq. And shipments still reach Iraq from Jordan. Rezun sums up the regional problems with such terms as greed, ambition, subterfuge, nationalism, and the international arms trade.

The oppressed citizenry of these states still has no hope of a better future. The author questions how the American new world order concept will apply to this region. The deep-seated problems of Southwest Asia remain, in spite of U.S. military intervention. The United States and the West can expect more problems in this area in the future.

This book is a must for area specialists and those interested in Southwest Asia. Intelligence personnel will find the historical summations useful. Long-range planners and strategists should examine the foreign assessments of U.S. military interventions in the region since they illuminate problems our military may encounter in the future.

Captain Gilles Van Nederveen
San Antonio, TX

The Facts on File, World Political Almanac, Second Edition by Chris Cook (New York: Facts on File, 1992), 496 pages, \$45.00.


The World Political Almanac is a handy, well-organized reference which brings often hard-to-find contemporary facts to your desk top. Worldwide treaties, alliances, and diplomatic and arms control agreements are readily found along with chronologies of major terrorist acts (through 1991), international conflicts and colonial wars (1945 to 1991), and the nuclear age. Tables are compact

and easy to digest. For example, population data is reported by country and major cities, and urbanization trends are calculated: did you know that Nicaragua urbanized itself from 34.9 percent in 1950 to 59.4 percent in 1985?

One of the best features in this reference is its dictionary of political terms, events, and actions from 1943 to 1991. From Ayatollah to Ba'athist, Dirty War to Operation Desert Storm, to Tiananmen Square, readers can quickly locate global events. The reference also contains a concise biographical dictionary that provides a capsulized refresher of world figures including Arafat, Bush, Dayan, Mubarak, Somoza, and Walesa.

The **World Political Almanac** provides innumerable facts and bits of geopolitical data that will save readers many trips to the library.

MAJ Thomas J. Ward
Camp Bullis, TX



Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime by Middle East Watch (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1991), 215 pages, \$25.00.

This is a Human Rights Watch book prepared by Middle East Watch to expose the Ba'athist Party's totalitarian government lead by Hafex Asad. A work such as this is the basic product of the Human Rights Watch—a group that maintains an overwatch on human rights worldwide.

This book is not a recreational read. While informative, it is written in a scholarly style not commonly used in mass market publications. It is an excellent single-source reference on Syria and its recent political history, going back to the mid-1970's. It also provides limited background on the country's earlier history.

But the real substance of the book is its expose of human rights abuses and the Syrian government. The author explores the subject from the top down: suppression of human rights in the government and the ministries through persecution of minority ethnic groups. Both anecdotal and in-depth organizational analysis is done. Anecdotal accounts come from first-person interviews with families or abuse victims themselves. When the authors discuss organizations, they use a "then and now" approach to purpose, leadership, and technique. This is a detailed study that dissects the Syrian government and contemporary society.

It is understandable that the authors seldom cite sources in substantiating their allegations. To do so could jeopardize the safety of victims and their family and friends. Consequently, to use this book as a research source could leave a scholastic researcher twisting in the wind. However, for anyone with a serious interest in Syria, **Syria Unmasked** is a great reference book.

SFC Carl G. Wells
Fayetteville, NC

Triumph Without Victory by the staff of **U.S. News and World Report** (New York: Random House, 1992), 480 pages, \$25.00.

When excerpts from **Triumph Without Victory** first appeared, they made headlines because of revelations about the purported attempt to "get" Saddam Hussein on the last day of the war; the use of a computer virus in Iraq's air defense network; and halting of the ground war before closing the back door near Basra.

The first part of the book examines the international uproar following the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and

how the allied coalition was formed. With the vast political differences within the coalition, the reader gets a sense of the intricate international relations involved. During the war, the relationship between the U.S. and Israel was critical. Readers get a peek at behind-the-scenes meetings, maneuvering, agreements, and disagreements between U.S. and Israeli officials. As Iraqi Scud missiles landed in Israel, tensions rose as the world waited to see if Israel would retaliate.

Triumph Without Victory deals exclusively with American forces, with overall reports from the 1st Infantry, 2d Marine Divisions, and VII Corps. Throughout the book, we get glimpses of the pilots at work and the ground forces in action. These accounts of engagements allow readers to experience the tensions, the uncertainty as to where the enemy was, and the exhilaration of success.

Maps show the initial disposition of coalition forces before the ground war and how some of the key battles developed. One weakness the authors admit to is their lack of access to Iraqi decision makers. Such accounts would have helped the reader understand actions the Iraqi government and our military took before, during, and after the war. The book ends after General Schwarzkopf's meeting with his Iraqi counterpart and the start of Saddam Hussein's suppression of internal dissent.

What makes this book so interesting is that the Persian Gulf War and the surrounding events are still recent enough so we can remember the public statements, the hostages, the call up of the Reserves, the U.N. vote, the Congressional debate, and the launching of both the air and ground war. **Triumph Without Victory** is well written in the objective style of U.S. News and World Report.

MAJ Kerry L. Kimble
Aurora, CO



The Quick and the Dead: Electronic Combat and Modern Warfare by Neil Munro (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 324 pages, \$29.95.

This well-written, informative report addresses the progress, or lack thereof, of electronic warfare (EW) development in the U.S. Armed Forces. This book was written just after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, by a reporter for **Defense News**. It provides information on basic U.S. military EW doctrine and organization; components that comprise the electromagnetic spectrum; U.S. EW systems under development; the force multiplier factor of EW systems on present and future battlefields; and the emphasis former Soviet military forces place on radioelectronic combat doctrine.

Much of Munro's book stresses the need for a significant shift in our military EW program to accommodate the restructuring of our military forces, the aftershocks caused by the decline of the Soviet threat, and the effect future DOD cuts will have on EW R&D.

Unfortunately, recent world events have outdated much of the book's information. This is especially true of EW developments in the three major branches of our armed forces and the author's assessment of the strengths and weaknesses in each of the service's EW programs.

M.S. Evancevich
Fort Huachuca, AZ



Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur by LTC Roy E. Appleman (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 456 pages, \$35.00.

Historians and intelligence officers have waited for someone to adequately cover many segments of the Korean War (1950 to 1953). If asked who would be the historian best suited to fill in the blanks, many would have said Roy Appleman. A retired Army lieutenant colonel and a long-time author of Korean War books, Appleman's credentials are impeccable and his work is well respected.

Disaster in Korea picks up the action from where Appleman's first volume, **History of the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)** leaves off. Appleman follows the Eighth U.S. Army as it progresses toward the campaign that was supposed to "bring the boys home by Christmas," to the Chinese army's surprise intervention. It ends with the death of General Walton Walker.

The intervention and the Eighth Army's subsequent retreat became a nightmare for American arms. These events changed the war's goal from that of victory to one of merely establishing a stabilized line; and the term "police action" became an ugly phrase. In **Disaster in Korea**, Appleman focuses on November and December of 1950 when the public's euphoria turned to dismay, and then to dread.

Appleman's examination of the strategic and tactical intelligence situation in **South to the Naktong; North to the Yalu** is still the key explanation as to whether our intelligence failed in

1950. And in this book's introduction he reviews that work to give the novice some background information and to nudge the memory of "old hands." Undoubtedly, a large Chinese force did face the Eighth U.S. Army when it made its "final" advance to unite all of Korea.


With this second book, Appleman brings a fresh perspective on the issue of the gap between Eighth Army in the west and X Corps in the east of North Korea. Other historians have explored this gap and cited it as a cause of subsequent problems the U.N. forces faced. It was this void between forces, they say, that the Chinese exploited to catch the U.N. forces "unaware."

However, Appleman discounts this theory as a factor in the defeat. He demonstrates that the Chinese didn't mysteriously encircle the U.N. forces from the "blind side," but made a frontal assault and used what flanks they could. There was no grand sweep as some have contended. The evidence clearly lies with Appleman. They came right down the paths the Americans hoped to go up. We simply didn't "see them" coming.

The tale of the retreat says much about the Army's problems in the late 1940's and early 1950, such as garrison troops needing constant training. In addition, the political expediency of filling ranks with Korean recruits worked well when the enemy was disorganized. However, this policy was a dismal failure when these troops confronted overwhelming numbers of well-disciplined, experienced troops. Appleman's description of the action and the analysis of units under fire are the stuff that command and training exercises are made of when seeking to avoid these same problems. Military historians will find that Appleman's writings ring true.

Appleman's style is appropriate for the subject. He gives his readers large and small pictures, and puts them all in perspective so you can easily see the problems and draw your own conclusions. **Disaster in Korea** is a welcome addition to the growing body of Korean War literature.

Peter Charles Unsinger
San Jose, CA



The Wald Report: The Decline of Israeli National Security Since 1967 by Emanuel Wald (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 278 pages, \$39.95.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have a reputation, built on spectacular combat successes and meticulously choreographed special operations, as one of the world's most proficient combat organizations. Many in American military circles admire the competence, ingenuity, and sheer guts displayed by the IDF in past campaigns, often against overwhelming odds. Now, in **The Wald Report**, we find an experienced Israeli officer telling us the Emperor Has No Clothes! Colonel Emanuel Wald asserts that the IDF is seriously flawed, often led by unprofessional dilettantes and self-serving non-team players. It is rife with subordinates who have lost the skill and edge that led to victory in 1967 and before.

Too bad that Wald's book is as flawed as he asserts the Israeli forces he writes about are.

The book begins by accusing the IDF of having flawed training, faulty command professionalism at all levels, with a doctrinally incorrect force structure which does not support assigned missions. According to the author, this exists because of rampant bureaucracy, personal influence

by a small elite on policy formulation, and a mixture of wrong or absent assumptions about basic defense issues.

Wald blames Israel's failed 1982 Lebanon incursion onto a distaste for night fighting, overcautious commanders, listless execution, poor staff work, and disregard for combined arms operations principles. Others have lodged these complaints, but Wald fails to connect cause and effect.

The war's biggest failure, Wald claims, was at senior and mid-level command echelons, where officers had no clear picture of events, made bad decisions, didn't press hard enough for forces to move, failed to pass intelligence to ground commanders, and generally exhibited "unprofessional" command behavior. Ariel Sharon, the minister of defense who masterminded the whole affair, is represented as the one person who knew what had to be done, and vainly directed his subordinates to do the right things, only to be ignored in the actual execution.

This picture is at odds with most other sources, which show Sharon to be a loose gun in the Israeli government, misleading both his subordinates and the Cabinet with hidden agendas he revealed only gradually. He purposely embroiled Israel and the IDF in a situation for which the only escape was the way he himself had devised. It would have been surprising had such a command environment **not** caused disorientation on the ground and confusion as to objectives and strategy.

The Wald Report, in its second section, deals with Israel's earlier conflicts. It is mildly more readable and supports its conclusions better: that military success in 1967 was largely a function of dumb luck and ineffective Arab armies; that because of the spectacular results of the Six-Day War, Israeli leaders drew false conclusions and ignored serious IDF flaws; and that all these chickens came home to roost during the nearly disastrous Yom Kippur and Peace For Galilee wars.

In section three, Wald explores the philosophy behind the apparent willy-nilly buildup of the IDF between 1973

and 1982. Along with a monotonous repetition of earlier arguments, he now approaches his main thesis: the bankruptcy of the "absolute security" concept. It is impossible to be prepared for every military contingency that could possibly occur, he argues here and throughout the final section, and the IDF has suffered greatly by trying. Yet, he offers no suggestions as to how Israel might rectify its defense philosophy.

This should have been a much more valuable book. Wald was head of the IDF general staff's long-term planning department. His *Report* is condensed from a four-volume study submitted to the Israeli chief of staff detailing the IDF's increasing bureaucratization and the deterioration of its command structure, combat capabilities, and officer corps. As it is, the book is virtually unreadable. One must read three-fourths of it to discover that "corps" is used two different ways, sometimes in the same paragraph, without clarification.

Tracking the action on the ground—particularly in Lebanon—was especially difficult, since Wald never names units, commanders, or staff officers when describing plans, movements, or engagements. A lack of maps and charts makes campaigns even more difficult to follow. I found myself going to four other sources just to figure out what really happened.

Sloppy translation might explain some of the book's defects, but what it needs most is a ruthless editor to chop out redundancies and add linkages between assertions and the rationales that are supposed to justify them. It's unfortunate that the book's faults obscure the issues, since the problems the book addresses—if valid—are crucial to Israel's military future.

MAJ Paul H. Smith
Laurel, MD

Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America by Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1991), 279 pages, \$13.00.

Peter Dale Scott is an English profes-

sor at the University of California Berkeley and Jonathan Marshall is the editor of the financial analysis page of the *San Francisco Chronicle*. The rather complex thesis of their book states:

"The U.S. national security establishment emerged victorious over fascism in 1945, then, to maintain its control, erected the threat called Soviet communism. When this menace dissolved, they invented narco-terrorism to keep their apparatus powerful and well funded. In creating and then fighting this crusade, the national security establishment actually introduced the narcotics threat into the northern Andes, Central America, and the Caribbean as a means of enriching their Latin American henchmen. This same establishment blamed Cuba and Nicaragua, who were actually innocent of deliberate involvement in drug dealing. Finally, the ultra-conservative courts and sympathetic law enforcement systems in the U.S. have refused to investigate, try, or convict any of the Reagan-Bush-era drug dealers who comprise the top echelon of national security institutions."

Scholars will respect this book because of its prestigious publisher, its abundance of footnotes, and the authors' reputation as serious researchers. This is unfortunate.

Although, the thesis seems to be borne out by the evidence presented, closer scrutiny reveals the authors use footnotes for events not fully retold, and they ignore critical events that occurred between 1987 and the publication date. Thus, all the Latin American narco-terrorists they speak of appear to be still at large, protected by President Reagan's national security leaders.

On the contrary, when checking off the roster of villains, we find they are either dead, out of power, in prison, or under indictment. The voluminous sources in *Cocaine Politics* do not make a convincing case that Latin America's governmental leaders in Colombia, Panama, Honduras, and El Salvador involved in narco-trafficking were under the "protective aegis of U.S. national security leaders."

Especially cruel is the authors' assertion that Colombian military

commanders sponsored the narco-terrorists there. As a matter of fact, the official record shows that numerous members of the Colombian military and law enforcement agencies have died in the fight against the heavily armed *narcotraficantes*. Further, the Colombian armed forces court-martials any soldier who sullies the military profession by connivance with drug traffickers.


In addition, Scott and Marshall's villainy theory collapses when one reviews the entire story that was known, through unclassified sources, when the book was published. While indicting top U.S. leaders for inventing and then sponsoring the narcotics menace, the authors also exonerate Fidel Castro and the former Sandinistas of any connection. Yet, in 1989 Castro executed his African campaign war hero, General Arnaldo Ochoa, and three others for allegedly dealing in drugs. For 2 years, leftist writers have stated in such journals as *The Progressive* that Ochoa was a scapegoat by which Castro hoped to distance himself from association with a policy of selling drugs.

Professor John Norton Moore, in his *The Secret War in Central America*, made an irrefutable link between the Sandinista government, Castro's Cuban regime, and selling drugs to raise cash. The then president, Daniel Ortega, publicly flaunted his drug selling policy and bragged how it would "finance his revolution within and bring down the Yankee war machine as a by-product."

Finally, portraying Pentagon brass as enthusiastic players in President Reagan's initial antinarcotics campaign is ridiculous. It is no secret in Washington that the Reagan White House had to make it clear to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the defense budget would suffer if the U.S. Armed Forces lagged behind in taking on an active drug-interdiction strategy.

I believe *Cocaine Politics* is a churlish cannon shot in a political gutter war. And it demeans the name of a publishing house that once carried the finest scholarly works on Latin American civilization.

Russell W. Ramsey,
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL



311th

Military Intelligence Battalion

The 311th MI Battalion unit crest consists of the coat of arms shield in oriental blue and silver gray. Attached below the shield is a gold scroll inscribed "Eyes of the Eagle" in black letters. The blue and gray checkered field suggests the collection of data to aid in the formulation of military strategy. The lightning bolts signify the use of electronics in collection operations. The dragon represents service in Vietnam and its scarlet color alludes to the award of three Meritorious Unit Commendations to elements of the battalion. The fleur-de-lis indicates service in Europe during World War II. The motto, "Eyes of the Eagle," refers to the division it supports, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

Headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the 311th MI Battalion (CEWI)

provides intelligence and electronic warfare support to the Army's only air assault division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The 101st is unique in its capability to move rapidly and wield combat power over great distances. As such, the 101st is called upon to respond to contingencies worldwide.

The 311th MI Battalion traces its heritage from April 20, 1944, when the 101st CI Corps Detachment was activated in Newbury, England. The detachment fought in four campaigns during World War II and was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, the Belgian Croix de Guerre Citation, and the Belgian Fourrageres Citation. Deactivated in France after World War II, the unit was reactivated on March 25, 1956, at Fort Campbell. On January 25, 1959, it was reorganized and redesignated as the 101st MI Detachment. On December 26, 1969, the detachment was redesignated the 101st MI Company. In the Vietnam War, the unit fought in 12 major campaigns and was awarded two Vietnamese Crosses of Gallantry with Palm and the Vietnamese Civil Action Honor Medal. The company returned to Fort Campbell after the war and was assigned to the 101st Airborne Division on February 21, 1978.

On January 1, 1981, the 311th MI Battalion was formed from the 265th ASA Company and the 101st MI Company, which were redesignated A Company and B Company, respectively. On June 1, 1982, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 311th ASA Battalion, was redesignated Headquarters, Headquarters and Operations Company, 311th MI Battalion. It was activated as a separate battalion of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The Long-Range Surveillance Detachment was assigned to the 311th on January 17, 1991.

The 311th continues to meet any challenge. In August, 1990, the battalion deployed to Southwest Asia for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, where it supported the largest air assault in Army history. Upon redeployment, the battalion recovered quickly, winning second place in the FORSCOM Commanding General's Maintenance Award Competition. Recently, the battalion began testing candidates for the Army's next generation of ground surveillance radars.

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